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ABSTRACT

This paper uses recent developments in the theory of optimal capital structure to demonstrate how the federal
corpolflte income tax with an interest deduction, but
without a corresponding dividend deduction, misallocates capital within the corporate sector by encouraging
investment in low-risk, low-growth projects employing
tangible assets over high-risk, high-growth projects employing intangible assets.
I.

INTRODUCTION

P

ROMETHEUS is fabled to have created man out of clay in the
image of the gods and to have taught his mortal progeny the
various ans and sciences. Mankind's resulting obsession with creating and building left little time for worshipping the gods. That
angered a jealous Zeus, who responded by extinguishing all
eanhly fires, causing much suffering on Eanh. Troubled by the
plight of his mortal progeny, Prometheus stole fire from Mount
Olympus and brought it back to Earth in a hollow fennel stalk.
For his
transgression, Prometheus was severely punished by
1
Zeus, who permitted mankind to keep fire and continue to practice the arts and sciences. 2
For his gifts to the human race, Aeschylus treats Prometheus
1. Zeus ordered Hermes to chain Prometheus to a rock on Mount Caucasus
where a vulture fed daily on his liver, which grew back each night. HESIOD, THE
HoMERIC HYMNS AND HoMERICA 117 (Hugh G. Evelyn-White trans., 1967). Mter
SO years, Zeus relented and Prometheus was freed by Heracles. ld.
2. In a myth related to us by the poet Hesiod, which reflects the sexist climate of the time, as mankind's punishment for Prometheus's act of stealing fire,
Zeus ordered Hephaestus to create Pandora, the first woman, and sent her to
Earth. ld. at 121. Ignoring Prometheus's warning, Epimetheus married her, allowing her to remove the lid from the box she carried, releasing evil, drudgery
and pestilence. ld. at 12!.
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as humanity's preserver in Prometheus Bound. 5 That view is echoed
in English literature, in which Prometheus is frequently depicted
as a courageous champion ofhumanity. 4 In the English language,
the term Promethean has come to mean boldly creative and defiantly original. 5 It is commonly used to describe significant technological advances. For example, the microprocessor6 and fusion
power7 have been described as Promethean, as have Gordon
Moore's laboratory at Fairchild Semiconductor,8 the technological
achievements ofJapan9 and the creativity of the United States. 10
Not only in mythology and modem times, but from before the
time of ancient Greece, technological advances have improved living conditions.ll Progress, however, was slow until the eighteenth
century, when a flood of innovation, called the industrial revolution, produced a rapid rise in income. 12 The pace of both techno3. AESCHYLUS, Promethew &nmd, in PROMETHEUS AND OTHER PLAYS 20, 20-52
(Philip Vellacott trans., 1961).
4. See, e.g., 4 GEORGE BYRoN, PRoMETHEUS, THE WoRKS OF LoRD BYRON 48,
50 (Ernest H. Coleridge ed., 1901) (describing Prometheus as one who lessened
"the sum of human wretchedness"); 2 PERCY SHELLY, Promethew Unbound, in THE
CoMPLETE WoRKS OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLY 178 (Roger Ingpen & Walter E. Peck
eds., 1965) (Prometheus uses man's knowledge as weapon to defeat evil). .
5. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1449
(3d ed. 1992); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1815 (1986). In Greek, Prometheus means foresight. PIERRE
GRIMAL, A CONCISE DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 376 (Stephen Kershaw ed. 8c A.R. Maxwell-Hyslop trans., 1990).
6. George Gilder, Galbraithian Truth and Fallacy, FoRBES, Nov. 12, 1979, at
117, 129 ("There is no way to fathom the full potential of this [microprocessing]
technology, now in its Promethean infancy.").
7. See gmeraUy Fusion, Sure-But for the Long Term, FoRBES, jan. 9, 1978, at
154, 154 (describing mankind's efforts to duplicate fusion reactions that occur on
sun as "a truly Promethean challenge").
8. George Gilder, Where are the Microchip BiUionairest, FoRBES, Oct. 23, 1989,
at 378-79.
9. Paul Addison & Mark McQuillan, Promethew Unbound and Unwelcome; Japan's Economic Leadership Stirs Admiration, Anxiety Across Asia, jAPAN EcoN. j ., Dec. I,
1990, at 4.
10. See Andrew Hacker, Bearish on America, FoRTUNE, Nov. 24, 1986, at 213
(discussing traits of United States that will allow it to remain as world's leading
economic power) (citing OxFORD ANALYI1CA, AMERICA IN PERSPECTIVE: MAJOR
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE 1990s I ( 1986) ("[The United
States] has invested so wisely in education, training, research, development and
other forms of human capital, that it will continue to surprise the world with its
flexibility, resilience, and sheer Promethean creativity.")).
II. SeeS. LILLEY, MEN, MAcHINES AND HISTORY: THE STORY OF TooLS AND
MACHINES IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS 319 (1966) (inventions such as agriculture, metallurgy, harnessing of animals and wheeled transport helped transform primitive life into civilization). See generally 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, TECHNOLOGY 440 (15th ed. 1993) (summarizing history of technology and its impact on civilized society).
12. See gmeraUy DAVIDS. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGI·
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logical advance and economic growth accelerated in the twentieth
century. 15 The latter half of this century has also yielded clear e~i
dence of the relation between the two. Income growth in the industrialized nations during the twentieth century has come not
primarily from capital accumulation but overwhelmingly from improvements in technology, broadly defined. 14
Recent years have seen a decline in productivity growth in the
industrialized countries and a concomitant drop in the rate of income growth.• 5 Although the drop in productivity growth has hit
most industrialized nations, the United States has been hit especially hard. 16 Observers from across the political spectrum see the
loss of technological leadership as a source of the current economic woes of the United States 17 and believe that increasing innovative activity, especially by encouraging investment in new
technologies, worker training, organizational practices and highCAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM J750 TO
THE PRESENT ( 1969) (providing comparative survey of European industrial
revolution).
18. See THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 11, at 460 (despite
immense technological advancements by 1900, following decades saw more advancement than whole of previous recorded history).
14. For a discussion ofthe link between income growth and improvements
in technology, see irifra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
15. Set John F. Helliwell &: Alan Chung, Aggregate Productivity and Growth in an
International Comparative Setting, in INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVl"IY AND CoMPETITIVENESS (Ben G. Hickman ed., 1992) (providing evidence of productivity convergence among Western industrialized nations); see also PAUL KRUGMAN, THE
AGE OF DIMINISHED ExPECTATIONS 11-12 (1990) (assening that sustained per
capita income growth can only come from productivity growth); Klaus Conrad,
lnttrcuuntry Changes in Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector of Five OECD Countries,
/961-86, in INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITIVENESS ch. 7 (Ben G.
Hickman ed., 1992) (analyzing changes in productivity gaps between United
States, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Germany).
16. Among 12 Western industrialized nations, the United States had the
lowest growth in labor productivity between 1960 and 1978 and the lowest, except for Canada, between 1978 and 1987. Anhur Neef, An International Comparison of Manufacturing Productivity and Unit Labor Cost Trends, in INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTIVITY AND CoMPETinVENESs,.supra note 15, at 137, 138 (depicting graphically manufacturing labor productivity for 12 countries for period 1960-87).
The impact on the United States has been exacerbated by the sharp acceleration
in earnings inequality, which in combination with the slow economic growth has
reduced the earnings of many less educated workers. Frank Levy&: Richard J.
Murnane, U.S. Earnings Lewis and Earnings IntquiJlity: A Rtvilw of Recent Trnuls and
Proposed Explanations, 80 j. EcoN. LITERATURE 1333, 1333 (1992).
17. The declining pace of technological innovation is panially responsible
for the dramatic fall in the growth of U.S. business sector productivity from
2.92% per year between 1947 and 1978 to 1.01% per year between 1973 and
1987. F.M. SCHERER&: DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 614 (3d ed. 1990).
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tech industries is part of the solution. 18 Commentators have identified several factors in the U.S. economy that distort incentives
and retard economic growth, including the federal income tax,
which imposes a higher burden on corporate than on
noncorporate investment.•9 This Article describes another
growth retarding distortion caused by the federal corporate income tax. The culprit is the favorable treatment of debt relative to
equity, most significantly the corporate interest deduction. The
thesis of this Article is that the corporate interest deduction, which
appears neutral because it permits all corporations to deduct interest, distorts the allocation of capital within the economy by encouraging investment in tangible, fixed assets and safe projects
and discouraging investment in .intangible assets, growth opportunities and risky projects. Thus, traditional technologies and inIS. Many commentators advocate a concened and direct government effort
to increase investment in critical high-tech industries. Sn, e.g., Lewis M. Brans·
comb, Dots America Nuda Tef/anowgy Policy'!, HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at
24, 25 (arguing that government should stimulate demand for innovative technologies by "encouraging collaborative research among companies and ... universities . . . and by helping to develop the tools and techniques that all
companies need to be more productive"); Clyde ~stowitz & Kevin Kearns, Forget the Q!Jiclc Fix,· Fundamental Problem is Our Emplaasis on Consumption Over Saving and
Investment, RoLL CALL, Poucv BRIEFING No. 37 (1992); Roben Kuttner, Facing Up
to Industrial PolicJ, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 22, 42 (arguing
that tax and regulatory treatment of America's fin-.ncial markets needs to be reformed to bolster "long-term investment in technologies, production processes
and people"); Robert B. Reich, Up the Workers: Industrial PoiU, Reconsidered, THE
NEw REPUBUC, May 13, 1991, at 21, 24 (arguing that United States government
has imponant role to play in emphasizing emergin' technologies "which are
likely to form the foundation stones of future industnes"). Even some critics of
industrial policy favor the federal government channeling more resources to research and development generally. Sn, e.g., Michael Boskin, ADDRESS AT THE EX1M BANK CoNFERENCE FOR ExPORTERS AND CoMMERCIAL BANKERS (Mar. 15,
1990); Paul Krugman, Spend: A I..ibtTal Economic Program, THE NEw REPUBUC, Dec.
23 & 30, 1991, at 20 (providing "wish list" of what new economic program ought
to include and proposing more government spending on education and infrastructure). Still others argue that reducing the tax rate on capital gains is the way
to spur such activity. Su EcoNOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 130-33 (1990)
(providing suggestions for governmental policies which can increase investment).
19. Other factors mentioned by commentators include differences in the
cost of capital, the shon-term outlook of business management, the dire state of
primary and secondary public education, insufficient savings and capital formation, a decline in entrepreneurship through a corporate reward system that encourages playing it safe and the rise of protectionism which reduces competition.
Sn RESEARCH AND POUCY COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVEL·
OPMENT; PRoDucnvTIY Poucv: KEY ro THE NAnoN's EcoNOMIC FUTURE (1983);
S« also MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOUS ET AL, MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE COM·
PETJTJVE EDGE 42-45 (1989) (classifying cause of United States' productivity
problem into six categories: outdated business strategies, preoccupation with
short-term results, technological weaknesses in development and production, neglect of human resources, failures of cooperation and conflicting purposes of
government and industry). Some of these factors are very controversial.
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dustries are encouraged at the expense of emerging technologies,
new production methods and high-tech industries.
The capital distortion occurs because the federal corporate
income tax, which taxes corporations as separate entities and allows corporations a deduction for interest but does not permit a
corresponding deduction for dividends or retained earnings, encourages corporations to issue debt. This Article, which relies on
recent economic scholarship demonstrating and explaining why
corporations in different industries have different debt capacities,
argues that because debt financing is tax-favored over equity financing, the larger an industry's debt capacity, the lower is its total effective tax rate and, therefore, the lower is its cost of capital.
Accordingly, among projects with the same expected net present
value, the federal corporate income tax encourages investment in
projects with a large debt capacity and discourages investment in
projects with a small capacity. In general, those activities with a
large debt capacity have less earnings variability, fewer prospects
for growth through profitable investment and employ more tangible assets. Conversely, riskier activities with more numerous opportunities for profitable investment that use more intangible
assets have a small debt capacity. Thus, the federal corporate income tax discourages investment in the latter group of projects.
Therefore, not only does the tax misallocate capital between the
corporate and noncorporate sectors, as is widely recognized by
commentators, 20 it also misallocates capital within the corporate
sector. This misallocation of capital within the corporate sector is
an inefficient and undesirable consequence of existing tax law,
which has been overlooked by scholars and policymakers. It also
operates to discourage investment in precisely those industries,
technologies and production methods that many observers see as
critical to the nation's economic future.
Section II of this Article reviews the literature on optimal capital structure. 21 Section III, the heart of the Article, argues that
20. Arnold Harberger 6nt argued that the classical corporate income tax
misallocates capital between the corporate and noncorporate seaon. See gtnnTJlly
Arnold C. Harberger, TM l'llridnt£e of thl Corporation Income Tax, 70 j. PoL. EcoN.
215 (1962). jane Gravelle estimates that the overall effective tax rate on corporate capital is 42%, which is 70% higher than the estimated 25% rate on
noncorporate investment. S« jANE G. GRAVELLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
CoRPORATE TAX INTEGRATION: IssuEs AND OPTioNs 2 ( 1991 ). Thus, for example,
if an investor's required after-tax return is 8%, then the required rate of return is
10% for noncorporate investments and 18.79% for corporate investments.
21. Readen who can probably skip this material without losing the argument are those with a grounding in capital structure theory at the level explained
in RICHARD A. 8REALEY Be STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
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the corporate interest deduction distorts investment, thereby making the nation poorer. Section IV argues that the tax advantage to
debt steers capital away from risky projects, growth opportunities
and intangible assets. Section V seeks to quantify the capital distortion caused by the corporate interest deduction and argues that
the distortion should be remedied. Section VI provides a discussion of different methods for remedying the capital distortion and
examines the effectiveness of the various corporate integration
proposals in reducing that distortion. Section VII is the
conclusion.
II.

UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTIJRE

It would be difficult to understand the consequences of the
corporate interest deduction without first considering how corporations set capital structure. Although disagreements and puzzles
remain, the finance community largely agrees on the economic
factors that have major influences on corporate capital structure. 22
Capital structure theory has both normative and positive elements. The normative question that capital structure theory addresses is what combination of debt and equity minimizes the
corporation's cost of capital. Choosing the capital structure that
minimizes the corporation's cost of capital is desirable because it
maximizes the value of the corporation. Positive theory addresses
the question of how corporations set capital structure. It is reasonable to assume that corporations tend towards minimizing
their cost of capital, as normative theory suggests, because if they
did not, investors aware of this unexploited opportunity could
profit by buying the corporation and adjusting its capital
structure. 25
A.

The Role of Taxes

Taxes are one influence on corporate capital structure. 24 The
cbs. 17 8c 18 (4th ed. 1991), STEPHEN A. Ross 8c RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD,
CoRPORATE FINANCE cbs. 15 8c 16 (3d ed. 1993), or WILLIAM A. KLEIN &joHN C.
CoFFEE, jR., BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC PRINCIPLES 306-38 (4th ed. 1990).
22. Set Ross 8c WESTERFIELD, SUfWtJ note 21, at 472.
23. KLEIN 8c CoFFEE, supra note 21, at 306-07.
24. In a classic paper, Franco Modigliani and Menon Miller showed that if
there are no taxes, no transaction costs and investment policy is fixed, then the
financial policies of a corporation are irrelevant. Franco Modigliani 8c Merton H.
Miller, The Cost of Capital, CurportJtiqn Finance and 1M Tlwry of lnvestmmt, 48 AM.
EcoN. REv. 261, 268-71 (1958). Thus, if capital structure matters it must be because of the impact of taxes, transaction costs or investment policy.
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federal corporate income tax, which subjects corporations to tax
on their taxable income as separate entities, 25 is currently 34% for
all but the smallest corporations.26 In calculating taxable income,
a corporation subtracts the interest it pays debtholders, 27 but it
cannot deduct the dividends it pays shareholders or the earnings it
retains. Thus, for every dollar that the corporation earns before
interest and taxes, the corporation can retain $.66 of earnings, pay
a $.66 dividend or pay $1 interest. Accordingly, every $1000 bond
paying interest at 10% that the corporation issues, using the proceeds to repurchase equity, will reduce the corporation's annual
tax bill by $34. 28 Because debt has such an attractive feature, the
corporation should always have debt in its capital structure.
Moreover, interest deductibility implies that the corporation's
value increases by issuing additional debt.2 9
The corporate income tax is not the only tax that influences
corporate capital structures. There is also the investor-level tax
on equity and debt, which cannot be ignored because the income
from debt and equity is taxed differently. 30 Although dividends
received by individual investors are taxed at the investor's ordinary income rate, as is interest, much of the return to equity occurs as appreciation in value, which incurs a different and highly
favorable tax treatment. 31 Appreciation is not taxed until the
25. I.R.C. § ll(a) (1988)
26. See I.R.C. § ll(b) (imposing tax of 34% on corporations with taxable
income exceeding $75,000).
27. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (granting deduction for all interest paid or accrued
within taxable year on corporate indebtedness).
28. This is arrived at by multiplying the annual interest payment of$ I 00 by
the 34% tax rate.
29. Modigliani Be Miller, supra note 24, at272-73 (explaining why deduction
of interest expense in computing taxable corporate profits cannot be replicated
by investors borrowing and purchasing stock in unlevered corporation). The
present value of an annual tax deduction of$34 indefinitely, discounted at 10%,
is $340. Thus, $340 is the value of the tax shield created by replacing equity with
a $1000 bond. Modigliani and Miller's original anicle did not properly value
interest tax shields. They described the correct method for valuing interest tax
shields in a later anicle. See Franco Modigliani Be Menon H. Miller, Crwporate
Income Taxes and the Ont of CapiiiJJ: ..4 Correction, 53 AM. EcoN. REv. 433, 435-37
(1963).
30. If the income from debt and equity were taxed identically, then the tax
advantage from corporate debt would be as described above. For a discussion of
the tax advantage of debt if the income from debt and equity are taxed identically, see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. See BREALEY Be MYERS, supra
note 21, at 427-28 (illustrating relative tax advantage of taxing income from debt
and equity identically).
31. Debt appreciation is also favorably taxed, but appreciation is a larger
ponion ofthe return to equity than to debt. See BREALEY 8c MYERS, supra note 21,
at 426-29 (explaining effect of debt in corporate and personal taxes); Theodore
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stock is sold, and even then it is only taxed at the rate prevailing
for capital gains, which is often below the rate on ordinary income. 52 In addition, if an investor dies holding appreciated assets,
the appreciation will forever escape tax. 55 For the above reasons,
the personal tax rate on equity is likely to be below the personal
tax rate on debt, and could be as low as zero.54
Merton Miller recognized that corporations trying to maximize their value will choose a capital structure that minimizes total
taxes, not just corporate taxes. 55 For every dollar the business
earns that is supported by debt, the total tax to the investor is the
personal tax on debt income. Alternatively, if the earnings are
supported by equity, the total tax to the investor is the corporate
and personal tax on equity income.56 Because tax rates vary
among investors, the corporation cannot choose whichever is
cheaper, debt or equity, because neither is necessarily cheaper.
To understand how corporations set their capital structures, it is
necessary to use Miller's argument based on progressive taxation.
To make the argument easier to follow, start with the assumption that the personal tax rate on equity is zero for all taxpayers. 57
This assumption implies that the total tax to the investor from equity financing is the corporate tax and the total tax from debt financing is the investor's personal tax. 58 In equilibrium, so as to
S. Sims, Long-Term Debt, the Term Structure of Interest and tlu Case for Accrual Taxation,
4 7 TAX L. REv. 313, 35 7 ( 1992) (accrual tax more imponant for debt than
equity).
32. The maximum capital gains tax rate is currently 28%. I.R.C. § I (h)
(Supp. II 1990). In contrast, the top marginal personal rate is 39.6%. Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13202, 107 Stat. 461, 461
(1993). The tax treatment of appreciation does not account for the time value of
money. See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capillll Gains Taxation, 81 AM. EcoN.
REV. 167, 167 (1991) (discussing taxpayers' willingness to hold appreciated assets to defer taxes on accrued gains).
33. This is because the investor's heirs will receive a tax basis equal to the
fair market value of the securities at the time of the investor's death. I.R.C.
§ 1014(a)(l) (1988).
34. See GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 10.
35. Menon H. Miller, Debt and TOJW, 32 J. FIN. 261, 268-72 (1977).
36. Let T r denote the personal tax rate on debt, T Pt: the personal tax rate on
equity income and T c the corporate tax rate. The total tax to the investor from
holding debt is T p, leaving the investor with I - T P· The total tax to the investor
from holding equity is I - (I - T c) (I - T Pt:), leaving the investor with (I - T c)
(I - TP£).

37. This assumption, though not essential for the argument, simplifies the
discussion.
38. The total tax to the investor from holding debt is still T p, leaving the
investor with I - Tr. The total tax to the investor from holding equity becomes
T c. leaving the investor with I - T c·
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minimize total taxes, investors with a marginal tax rate below the
corporate rate hold only debt, whereas investors with a marginal
tax rate above the corporate rate hold only equity. An investor
with a marginal tax rate equal to the corporate rate is called the
marginal investor and can hold either debt or equity or both. ' 9
Because financial advisors have long been aware of the tax
consequences of debt and equity, Miller argued that any advantage from issuing debt has long been competed away. Thus, it is
likely that the economy is in equilibrium with respect to the issuance of debt and equity. Accordingly, the tax treatment has an
impact on the optimal debt-to-equity ratio for the corporate sector
as a whole, but there is no optimal debt-to-equity ratio for an individual corporation. Thus, despite the deductibility of interest payments, a corporation cannot change its value by changing its
capital structure.•o
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Act), 41 the corpo39. An example might make this clear. Assume all corporations are taxed at
a rate of 40% and that the marginal investment project generates a return of
10%. This implies that all investors receive 6% after-tax when there is only equity. Assume further that there is a system of progressive taxation, with some
investors tax-exempt and others taxed at rates as high as 60%, with investors
scattered over the full range. The first corporation to issue debt can offer a return just over 6%, say 7%; this will induce tax-exempt investors to buy the
bonds. Once one corporation issues debt, other corporations follow. Soon all
tax-exempt investors have their entire investment portfolios in debt. Assume the
next large group of investors is in the 20% tax bracket. These investors would
receive only 5.6% after-tax if they purchased corporate bonds payin' 7%, which
is less than the 6% they receive from equity. To induce these mvestors to
purchase debt, corporations have to increase the interest rate to more than 7.5%.
Assume they set the interest rate at 8%. This is still attractive to the corporations
because they save 2%, the difference between 10% and 8%. The process of issuing new debt continues until the interest rate on debt is 10%, at which point
corporations no longer derive an advantage from issuing debt. If, for example,
the interest rate was 12%, corporations would lose 2% by issuing debt; they
would, then, issue equity and retire debt until the interest rate fell to 10%.
40. Miller stated his conclusion as follows:
There will be an equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt ... and
hence an equilibrium debt-equity ratio for the corporate sector as a
whole. But there 'UHIUid M 110 optimum debt ratio for any indivilluaJ firm. Companies following a no-leverage or low leverage strategy (like I.B.M. or
Kodak) would find a market among investors in the high tax brackets;
those opting for a high leverage strategy (like the electric utilities) would
find the natural clientele for their securities at the other end of the scale.
But one clientele is as good as the other. And in this important sense it
would still be true that the value of any finn, in equilibrium, would be
independent of its capital structure, despite the deductibility of interest
payments in computing corporate income taxes.
Miller, mpra note 35, at 269.
41. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
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rate tax rate was 46%. 42 Individual tax rates were progressive
with a maximum individual tax rate of 50%.0 Prior to 1981, the
maximum individual tax rate on investment income was 70%.
Thus, Miller's argument implies that corporate debt would have
increased after personal tax rates were lowered in 1981.44 Moreover, assuming a personal tax rate on equity income of zero, because the top personal rate exceeded the corporate rate, there
would have been throughout this period an upper limit on the aggregate amount of debt below 100%.45 However, today, because
the 1986 Act reduced the top personal tax rate (currently 33%)
below the statutory corporate rate (34%), 46 the Miller model implies that close to 100% debt is optimal in the post-1986
economy.47
Of course, the Internal Revenue Service would disallow interest deductions for any corporation that had close to 100% debt. 48
42. I.R.C. § 11 (b)(5) (1982), amended by I.R.C. § 11 (b) (1988).
43. I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (1982), amended by I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (1988).
44. Whether leverage increased following the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34,95 Stat. 172 (1981), depends on how leverage is measured. For example, in 1981, nonfinancial corporations as a whole
withdrew a sizeable amount of equity from the market, but the aggregate book
value debt-to-equity ratio fell. Set Margaret M. Blair &:. Roben E. Litan, Corporate
Leverage and Leveraged Buyouts in the 1980's, in DEBT, TAXES AND CORPORATE RESTRUcrtJRINC 43, 49-53 (John B. Shoven &:Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990) (comparing figure 8 on p. 53 with figure 5 on p. 49). However measured, corporate debt
increased substantially during the 1980s. TREASURY DEP'T REPORT, INTEGRATION
OF THE INDMDUAL AND CoRPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME
ONCE 7-11 (1992). Even so, ERTA introduced safe harbor leasing among other
reforms, making it difficult to isolate the effect of rate changes. See, e.g., Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172, 203
(1981), reptGied by, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-514, § 201, 100 Stat.
2085, 2121 (1986) (providing special rules for leases). Another (independent?)
factor in the growth of corporate debt during the 1980s is the development of the
high-yield (junk) bond market.
45. The equity of a corporation with a capital structure that is 100% debt is
wonhless because there is no possibility of the equity receiving anything of value.
This is a much stricter condition than the condition that the market value of the
corporation is less than the face value of the debt because the possibility of good
fonune gives the equity value. Although it is rare to find corporations with 100%
debt, even in reorganization, I 00% debt is a useful construct as an upper limit on
leverage. See Ku:1N &:. COFFEE, supra note 21, at 335-38 (using approximately
100% debt in example to illustrate limits on use of debt).
46. Set gmerally Gene Steuerle, Postwar Clumges in tl&e Overall TtiX System, 54
TAX NOTES 1163, 1167-70 (1992) (discussing recent history of tax rates).
4 7. The incentive to issue I 00% debt is even stronger if the effective personal tax rate on equity income is positive, which it is because of dividends and
forced sales. See GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 5.
48. See I.R.C. § 385 (1988) (providing IRS with authority to challenge corporate taxpayers' claims for interest deductions and factors to be taken into account by IRS).
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However, the Service rarely contests interest deductions on corporations, even those with debt-to-equity ratios as high as 10-to-1.49
Yet few corporations have a debt-to-equity ratio anywhere near
this large/so and some very successful corporations have little or
no debt in their capital structure.
Jane Gravelle estimates that the spread between the effective
total tax rates of equity and debt is around 50%. 51 This estimate,
if accurate, implies that a corporation could reduce the total tax
burden on its investors by 50% by issuing debt and repurchasing
equity. Although estimates of the spread vary, 5 ~ there is a consensus that there is a large tax advantage from debt. 55 Understanding
why many corporations issue little debt, despite the potential tax
savings, is the subject of the next section, which introduces the
costs of financial distress.
B.

The Rok

of Financial Distress

The Miller model is based on two critical assumptions: that
bankruptcy is costless and that all interest tax shields can be used
or transferred at full value. As these two critical assumptions are
49. There is a long history of attempts to provide clear rules to distinguish
debt from equity. See BoRIS I. BriTKER & jAMES S. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4ft'~! 4.02-.0!J (1987) (discussing
factors that impact classification of investment instruments). The current
method for distinguishing debt from equity is to look at a variety of factors, including the debt-to-equity ratio, the intent of the panies, whether all investors
hold debt and equity in similar proponions and whether interest is contingent.
/d. at 11 4.04. A myriad of other factors also affect the determination of whether a
panicular investment instrument represents debt or equity. Set, e.g., In rr Lane,
742 F.2d Ull, 1!114-15 (lith Cir. 1984) (providing list ofthineen factors that
merit consideration when making debt/equity determination); Fin Hay Realty
Co. v. United States, !198 F.2d 694, 697 (Sd Cir. 1968) (explaining that ultimate
question in making debt/equity determination is whether stockholders' entire investment represents risk capital subject to fonunes of corporate venture or
whether debtor-creditor relationship exists between corporation and shareholder); set gmertdiJ William T. Plumb, Jr., Tire Fttlerall'fiCOIM Tox Significance of
Corporate Debt: .A Crilical.A1Illl.ysis tmd a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REv. S69 ( 1971) (providing thorough discussion of factors relevant in determining whether debt should
be respected or reclassified as equity).
50. The average capital structure of a leveraged buyout in 1988 had 87%
debt and IS% equity. Mark Gertler & R. Glenn Hubbard, TOJClltion, CorfHwaJ.e Capil4l Structure and Firt.tmcild Dislrlss, in 4 TAX Poucv AND THE EcoNOMY 4S, 47-48
(Lawrence Summers ed., 1990).
51. GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at II.
52. Set Genter & Hubbard, supra note 50, at 59 (giving examples of different
experts' estimates of spread). For example, the spread between the effective total
tax rates of equity and debt is around SO%. /d.
55. S. TUASURY DEP'T REPoRT, sufmJ note 44, at ch. I (discussing tax advantage from debt financing).
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relaxed, the model's conclusions break down, and each corporation has an optimal capital structure with less than 100% debt.

I. The Declining Value of Tax Shields
The Miller model assumes that corporations can always realize full value for their interest tax shields. This is not so. Because
the federal government does not provide tax refunds to loss corporations and because tax losses are not easily salable, corporations have a limited capacity to use the interest tax shields
generated by debt. 54 Consequently, as leverage increases, the
marginal value of the interest deduction falls.
If corporate after-interest income is negative, the corporation
does not receive a rebate of34% of the loss; instead, its annual tax
liability is zero. The tax law provides that the corporation can use
losses to obtain a refund of corporate income taxes paid in the
previous three years. Losses that are not used to offset income
accrued in the prior three years are suspended and carried forward to succeeding years where they can be used to reduce taxable
income to zero. 55 Mter fifteen years, unused losses expire. 56
Thus, interest deductions beyond those that reduce the corporation's three-year income to zero do not generate a current benefit.
Of course, current losses that are not used until later years have a
smaller present value than those used currently, and the decline
increases with the delay.
The tax law contains numerous rules designed to hamper the
ability of corporations to transfer losses. 57 The existence of substantial losses that corporations are not currently using implies
that these provisions have an effect. 58
in the context of the Miller model, consider one corporation
with an uncertain earnings stream that cannot transfer its excess
tax shields. 59 Such a corporation would not want to have so much
54. Tax specialists say that the corporate tax does not provide corporations
with full loss offsets but only with incomplete loss offsets.
55. I.R.C. § 172 (b)(l)(A)(i) (1988).
56. I.R.C. § 172 (b)(l)(A)(ii).
57. Set B11TKER 8c EusncE, supra note 49, at 11 16.20 (1987) (discussing
weapons available to Internal Revenue Service to combat acquiring companies
seeking to use loss-canyovers of acquired companies).
58. Rosanne Altshuler 8c Alan j. Auerbach, The Significtmct of Tax I...aw Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation, 105 QJ. EcoN. 61, 70-75 (1990). This does not
imply that loses can never be transferred; the leasing industry proves otherwise.
It suggests only that there are effective limits on transferability.
59. Assume the economy has a corporate tax rate and progressive personal
taxes with a maximum above the statutory corporate rate.
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debt that there was a chance of it having a taxable loss, which
would occur if its annual income (after deductions including interest) were negative. Accordingly, in the event of a loss, the present
value of the deduction on the last dollar of interest is less than the
statutory rate of$.34. Assuming the economy was at a Miller equilibrium, and the corporation had a chance of not using its entire
interest deduction in a given year, the corporation would not be in
equilibrium because the expected present value of the corporation's deduction on the last dollar of interest would be less than
the statutory corporate rate. Thus, the possibility that the corporation might not currently use the entire deduction implies that
the total tax on debt exceeds the total tax on equity. It follows
that, as long as there was any chance that some of the interest
would not be immediately deductible, the equityholders would
benefit by issuing equity and using the proceeds to retire debt. 60
As the exception becomes the rule, and more corporations
resemble the one in the above paragraph, the results of the Miller
model break down. There is no longer an aggregate optimal debt
level for the economy, with all corporations indifferent towards
their capital structure. Instead, each corporation has an optimal
debt level at which the expected marginal value of the tax shield
equals the personal tax rate of the marginal taxpayer in the
economy. 61
For any corporation, the value of the marginal tax shield will
equal the statutory tax rate only if the corporation is cenain to use
the deduction currently. For very low levels of debt, this might be
the case for some corporations. Nevenheless, as leverage increases, the chance of not being able to use the deduction (currently, if at all) rises, thereby reducing the expected realizable tax
shield on additional debt. Accordingly, the expected realizable
tax shield falls as leverage increases. 62 The available evidence
60. If there were any chance that the corporation could have a negative
before-interest income, then it would retire all of its debt. The discussion ignores any tax on appreciation of the debt, which is usually small.
61. Harry DeAngelo and Ronald W. Masulis, optinud Cafrital Structure Urullr
Corpqrutuflll Pmtmld Tamrion, 8J. FIN. EcoN. ~. ~-18 (1980). The identity of the
marginal taxpayer is determined through the interaction of all firms and investors. /d. at ~. This assumes that the income from equity escapes personal tax. /d.
at 11. If it is taxed, the personal-level tax advantage to the marginal investor of
equity replaces the tax rate of the marginal investor in the equilibrium condition
described in the text. /d.
62. RONALD W. MAsuus, THE DEBT/EQ.UITY CHOICE 25-~0 (1988).
Evidence supports the importance of taxes in corporate capital structure decisions. S. DeAngelo & Masulis, sufmJ note 61. For example, the announcement
of capital structure changes is linked to stock price changes. MAsuus, SllfmJ, at
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supports the conclusion that corporations have a limited capacity
for the interest deductions generated by debt because the effective
corporate tax rate is below the statutory rate. 65

2. Costs

of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress

In addition to the declining value of the interest tax shields,
the costs associated with financial distress discourage leverage.
These costs are commonly divided into direct and indirect costs.
a. Direct Costs
Once a corporation files for protection from its creditors, or
creditors to whom the corporation has defaulted file to enforce
their claims, an elaborate and expensive bankruptcy proceeding,
perhaps lasting many years, commences.64 The purpose of this
proceeding is to determine whether the business should continue
or be liquidated and to resolve the competing claims to the corporation and its assets. 65
24-25. In addition, revisions in the Internal Revenue Code cause rapid changes
in corporate capital structures. /d. at 28.
63. Rosanne Altshuler and Alan Auerbach estimate that during the early
1980s, when the statutory tax rate was 46%, the average effective corporate tax
rate was around 32%. See Altshuler & Auerbach, supra note 58, at 80 (concluding
that effective marginal tax rates for corporations varied from 18.9% to 38.6% in
1982 when statutory tax rate was 46%). Roger Gordon and jeffrey MacKie-Mason estimate that in 1988, when the statutory rate was 34%, the effective corporate tax rate was around 29%. See Gertler & Hubbard, supra note 50, at 59 (citing
Roger H. Gordon & jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Eff«ts of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
on Corporclte Financial Policy tmd Organizational Form, University of Michigan Mimeograph (Sept. 1989)).
64. There is extensive literature on bankruptcy, much of it critical. Michael
Bradley Be Michael Rosensweig, The Unlmabll Case For Chapter II, I 0 I YALE LJ.
1043, 1045 (1992); see, e.g., Douglass G. Baird, The U1144SJ Case for Corporclte Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL Sroo. 127 (1986) (criticizing bankruptcy law); Lucian Ayre
Bebchuk,A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 H.uv. L. REV. 775 (1988)
(same).
65. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of
Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 j.L EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 253, 253-54 (1992);
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity :r Sluzre in the BanlcrupkJ Reorganization of large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 12730 (1990) (describing legal context of bankruptcy proceedings). Ifa corporation
becomes bankrupt either its assets will be sold to satisfy creditors claims or the
corporation will be reorganized. Bebchult Be Chang, supra, at 253. In either case
the absolute priority rule requires that investors receive value in accordance with
their priority. LoPucki & Whitford, supra, at 134. Frequently, this means that
equityholders are cut out. Bebchuk Be Chang, supra, at 254. Nevertheless, what
debtholders receive depends on how much value can be realized from the company's assets. /d.
Although the law provides that in li'{uidation debtholders are paid in full
before equityholders receive anything, equttyholders control the corporation and
their ability to delay a resolution of the bankruptcy provides them with bargain-
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The direct costs of financial distress are those legal and administrative costs that the corporation and its stakeholders incur
at all stages before and during the corporate bankruptcy. 66 Assuming that these costs are not so small that they can be ignored,
then under reasonable assumptions expected bankruptcy costs
vary directly with the probability of bankruptcy, which varies directly with leverage. Thus, as corporate leverage increases, expected bankruptcy costs rise.67
Although the magnitude of such direct costs have long interested economists, the first study of bankruptcy costs was published
in 1977 by Jerold Warner, who examined the legal and administrative costs of eleven railroad bankruptcies. 68 Warner reports that
the average cost was $2 million, which was 5.3% of the market
value of the railroad's outstanding debt and equity securities just
prior to bankruptcy and 1.4% of their market value five years earlier.69 Because of Warner's small sample, the extensive regulation
of the industry, and the special bankruptcy procedures that railroads followed, the applicability of Warner's results to other industries is unclear. 70 More recent studies by Lawrence Weiss and
Michelle White, using larger samples, suggest that direct bankruptcy costs average approximately 3% of the asset value of corporations with more than $100 million in assets and larger
portions for smaller corporations. 71
b.

Indirect Costs

Although there are no good quantitative measures of indirect
costs of financial distress, financial economists believe that such
ing leverage from which they can often extract a payment. /d.; LoPucki 8c Whitford, supra, at 127-31.
66. Ross 8c WESTERFIELD, supra note 21, at 454. Because the lawyers get
paid before the creditors do, one effect of bankruptcy is to reduce the value distributed among the creditors. Thus, ex-post, the costs of bankruptcy are effectively paid by the firm's creditors. However, ex-ante, the equityholders bear the
present value of bankruptcy costs, because creditors, realizing that there will be
less value to split among themselves in the event of bankruptcy, will require a
higher interest rate. The additional interest amounts to a transfer to creditors as
compensation for expected bankruptcy costs. /d. at 453, 458.
67. BREALEY 8c MYERS, supra note 21, at 436-37.
68. jerold B. Warner, Banltruptcy Costs: Srnn4 Evidence, 32 J. FJN. 337 (1977).
69. See itJ. at 340 tbl.1, 343 tbl.5.
70. MAsuus, supra note 62, at 33.
71. Lawrence A. Weiss, Banltruptcy /liSolution: Direct Costs and ViolaiUm ofPriority Claims, 27 j. FIN. EcoN. 285, 288-90 (1990); Michellej. White, Banltruptq Costs
and the NftJI Banltruptcy Code, 38J. FIN. 477,486-87 (1983).
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indirect costs exceed the direct costs. 72 These indirect costs capture the difficulties and inefficiencies of running a corporation that
is either threatened with or going through bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can undennine management's control over tlie corporation's operations. However, the largest indirect costs are incurred
before bankruptcy when the corporation is in financial distress.
These costs are of two kinds. The first is the corporation's tendency to pursue non-value maximizing strategies; the second is interference with the corporation's relationships.
If a single individual managed and held all of the corporation's outstanding securities, there would be no conflicts. For example, a sole proprietor will choose to go skiing rather than spend
the weekend reviewing financial statements when the pleasures of
time on the slopes is worth more to the sole proprietor than the
financial rewards of a better understanding of the business. The
sole proprietor internalizes both the skiing and the profit. Except
for very small corporations, it is not practical for one individual to
make every decision and hold all securities. Several layers of management and widely disbursed holdings of the corporation's securities characterize the modern business corporation. As a
result, rational, self-interested individuals will not internalize all
consequences of their actions. For example, although the manager alone enjoys the weekend ski trip, the manager does not receive all of the benefits of the manager's additional work, much of
which accrue to the corporation's investors. This provides the
manager with an incentive to shirk responsibility.''
Financial economists have identified several potential conflicts within the modem corporation. These include conflicts between equityholders and managers 74 and between equityholders
72. Su BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 21, at 457-39; Ross & WESTERFIELD,

suJWa note 21, at 454-58.

73. Michael jensen and William Meckling argue that because investors are
aware of these conflicts, firms have incentives to restrain them. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Tlwry of the Firm: M~l BeluzvUw, Agmcy Costs and
Oummhip Slnlcturt, 5 j. FIN. EcoN. 305, 325-28 (1976). Nevenheless, because
enforcement is costly and imperfect, these conflicts can be reduced but not eliminated. /d. at 524-25; see also Eugene F. Fama, Agmcy Problmu and tlw Tlwry of tlw
Firm, 88j. PoL. EcoN. 288 (1980) (explaining that market aids in disciplining and
giving opponunities to management).
74. ADOLPH A. BERLE,jR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220-52 (1953). Managers have an incentive to pay
themselves large salaries, provide generous perks and lavish workin' conditions
and not work very hard. The investors might have a hard time momtoring their
managers and might therefore find it difficult to restrain their behavior. jensen &
Meckling, supra note 75, at 527-28; see MAsuus, supra note 62, at ch. 6 (reviewing
literature on equityholder-manager conflicts of interest).
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and debtholders. 75 Many researchers have examined the equityholder-debtholder conflict and the consistent message is that
these conflicts create incentives for equityholders to take actions
that benefit themselves at the expense of debtholders. 76
The conflicts that exist between equityholders, who indirectly
select the management of the corporation by electing the board of
directors, and the corporation's creditors are magnified as the corporation's finances deteriorate. Indeed, the lower the market
value of the equity relative to that of the debt, the more likely it is
that the course of action that maximizes the equity's value is not
the one that maximizes the corporation's value. The extent to
which corporations pursue non-value maximizing policies represent one source of the indirect costs of financial distress. Financial
economists have identified several such strategies. The two that
follow are the most important in the context of this Article.
One strategy that a management responsive to the interests of
its equityholders might take is to increase the value of the equity at
the expense of the debt by increasing the corporation's risk. Because oflimited liability, when the risk of the corporation's underlying business is increased, equityholders receive a
disproponionate share of any gain whereas debtholders suffer a
disproponionate sh3:re of any loss. Thus, equityholders can gain
when the corporation pursues a risky project that has a negative
expected value. In the financial literature, this is called asset substitution. 77 The asset substitution problem is associated with fi75. Equity selects the corporation's board of directors, which in turn hires
the management, who operate the business. The management is responsible to
the shareholders, to whom it owes various fiduciary duties. The management
does not owe corresponding duties to its creditors. Instead, its obligations to its
debtholders are determined by the bond indenture. Accordingly, in spite of the
conflicts that exist between management and equity, the management of a corporation is thought to be and is generally treated as more responsive to equity than
to debt. Su STEWART C. MYERS, SnLL SEARCHING FOR 0PnMAL CAPITAL STRucTURE 11 (Working Paper, rev. version, june 1990).
76. Su MAsuus, SUfml note 62, at S5 (citing other relevant sources).
77. jensen&: Meckling, SUfml note 7S, at SS4-S7. An example might be useful. Consider a corporation that has the opponunity of investing $60 in a project
that has three equally-likely possible outcomes. The project will either yield
$100 (a gain of $40), $SO (a loss of $SO), or $20 (a loss of $40). The project,
thus, has an expected loss of $10. If the e<JUityholders in an all-equity-financed
corporation discovered that the corporation s mana~rs embarked on such a project, they would rightly be upset. However, the equatyholders might change their
attitude if the corporation were partially financed by debt. Assume the other
assets of the corporation had a market value of $105 and were riskless, and that
the corporation had debt outstanding with a face value of $100. If the corporation rejected the project, the equityholders' stake would be wonh $5. If the corporation accepted the project, then the equityholders would have a two-thirds
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nancial distress because equity's incentive to accept high-risk
projects that have a negative expected value is strongest when the
value of the equity cushion is small and decreases as the equity
cushion increases. 78
Conflicts of interest can also lead equityholders to forgo
projects that would increase corporate value. This can occur if the
face amount of debt exceeds the debt's market value and the proposed project requires external financing. Under these circumstances, the equityholders may not be willing to fund the project
because some of the benefit goes to the debtholders. This is the
underinvestment problem. 7 9 It is also· associated with financial
distress because the equityholders' reluctance to invest increases
as the difference between the face and market values of the debt
increases. 80
There is a second group of indirect costs. Financial distress
can interfere with the corporation's . noncontractual relationships
with employees, customers and suppliers. 81 Because it is impractical to cover all contingencies with written contracts and impossichance that their shares would be worthless. However, they would also have a
one-third chance that their shares would be wonh $45. Thus, by undertaking the
·proposed project, the expected value of the equityholders' stake has risen from
$5 to $15. The loss, of course, is borne by the debtholders, who see their claim
fall in value from $100 to $80. This strategy is not only harmful to the
debtholders, it is also harmful to the corporation and to the economy as a whole,
because the aggregate value of the corporation falls from $105 to $95.
78. Set BREALEY &: MYERS, supra note 21, at 441. The above project would
not be attractive to the equityholders if the corporation's assets were wonh $200,
for they would then suffer the entire loss if the corporation undenook the
project.
79. Stewart C. Myers, DetermiJUJnts ofCt!rporaU .Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. EcoN. 147,
149-55 ( 1977) [hereinafter Myers, Corporate .Bomnlling]. As an example of the underinvestment problem, consider another corporation that has a bond with a face
value of$100 outstanding. Given the projects that the corporation has currently
underway, there is a 50% chance that the corporation will have a value of $80
when the bond matures and a 50% chance that its value ~1 be $110. The corporation has a good and safe investment opportunity, an investment of$10 that will
immediately yield $15. However, the corporation cannot fund the project out of
its own funds, which are all tied up. If the equityholders fund the project, they
will see the value of their stock increase by $7.50, from $5 to $12.50, which is less
than the $10 cost of the investment. Of course, the debtholders gain the other
$7.50 and the value of their bonds increases ~m $90 to $97.50. New equityholders will not fund the project either. The only possible purchasers are the
debtholders, with whom it may be difficult to strike a deal. Indeed, the Trust
Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. t§ 77a-bbbb (1988), which requires unanimity to
change the terms of the indenture, creates a severe holdout problem. Although
debtholders benefit, they cannot coerce recalcitrant debtholders to participate.
This provides each small debtholder with an incentive to hold out because the
benefit still accrues if the other debtholders make the investment.
80. Set BREALEY &: MYERS, supra note 21, at 442.
81. Ross&: WESTERFIELD, supra note 21, at 455.
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ble to cover some, many contingencies are not provided for by
explicit contracts. Instead, parties perform on the assumption
that their counterparties will perform. Performing implicit commitments is not naive as long as the counterparty stands to gain
more by performing than by not performing. Financial distress
calls into question a counterparty's ability to perform, and therefore discourages parties from making new commitments and encourages· them to break old ones. 82 For example, if bankruptcy is
a significant possibility, the corporation's suppliers will be reluctant to commit facilities to servicing a long-term contract and customers will be reluctant to purchase durable products from a
corporation that might not be around to service them. 83 Also, a
corporation in financial distress can have trouble maintaining key
employees; worried about their future with the company, they will
be quick to accept employment elsewhere.
The little evidence that is available on the magnitude of the
indirect costs of financial distress confirms the view that they are
large.84 Edward Altman measured these costs, which include
those costs related to loss of customers, suppliers and employees
and the redirection of managerial resources, as the difference between the corporation's current sales and the product of the corporation's historical fraction of industry sales and current industry
sales, all multiplied by the corporation's historical profit margin.
From a sample of nineteen bankruptcies by retail and industrial
corporations, Altman found that total financial distress costs were
substantially higher for industrial than for retail corporations.
82. &e Sheridan Titman, TN Effect of Capilal Structure on a Firm :S LiiJuidatitm
Decision, 13J. FIN. EcoN. 157, US-59 (1984). There is an extensive literature on
implicit contncts. &e gmeraUy, Oliver Han 8c Bengt Holmstrom, TM Tlwry of
Contracts, in ADVANCES IN EcoNOMIC THEoRY (Truman F. Bewley eel., 1987)
(commenting on implicit contracts' effect on economy).
·
85. For example, many loyal Chrysler customers turned to other automakers
when Chrysler was threatened with bankruptcy in the 1970s. Ross 8c WESTEil·
FIELD, SUfml note 21, at 455.
84. The most widely cited evidence of the indirect costs of financial distress
is the approximately $2 billion rise in the stock price of Texaco when its bank·
ruptcy suddenly ended long before expected. &e David M. Cutler 8c Lawrence H.
Summers, TM Costs of Conflict Resolutitm and Fintmcial Distras: Evidmafrom 1M Texaco-Pmnzoil Litigation, 19 RANDj. EcoN. 157, 159-64 (1988); Robert H. Mnook.in
8c Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Mtriet Efficimcy: Uruimlllnding
Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L REv. 295, 509-10 (1989). This evidence should be
taken with some caution. First, it is dangerous to draw general conclusions from
a sample of one. Second, there are indications that Texaco was a potential takeover target at the time, in which case the rise in price might reflect profits from a
possible takeover rather than savings from an early depanure from bankruptcy.
&e DouGLAS G. BAIRD, REVISING AUCTIONS IN CHAPTER II 12 (Chi. L 8c Econ.
Working Paper No.7, 2d Series, 1992).
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The total costs of financial distress were 12.1% of corporate value
five years prior to filing and 16.7% at the time of filing. Altman
also found that average direct costs were 5% of corporate value
both at the time of filing and five years prior. 85
C.

The Capital Structure Decision

The causal connection between corporate leverage and financial distress costs is not just in one direction. Not only does high
leverage increase expected financial distress costs, but the possibility of incurring these costs encourages many corporations to
avoid high leYerage. 86 Although there is no simple mathematical
formula for optimal capital structure, the principle is straightforward. Increasing leverage increases the potential total tax shield.
However, as leverage increases, two effects offset the interest deduction. First, the marginal value of the tax shield falls because
the probability that the interest deduction cannot be fully used increases. Second, increasing leverage increases the probability that
the corporation will experience bankruptcy or financial distress,
thereby raising the corporation's expected financial distress costs.
85. Edward Altman, A Further Empiricallnwstigatitm of the &nlcTuptcy Cost Ques-

tion, 89 j. FIN. 1067, 1076-88 (1984).

86. The agency costs imposed by debt also provide corporations and their
advisors with the incentive to find ways of mitigating these costs through special
contract provisions. These covenants protect.debtholders from equityholders by
permitting debtholders to·declare a default if the corporation takes cenain actions or cenain conditions occur. For example, it is common for covenants in an
indenture to limit dividends and other transfers to equityholders, to preclude
additional borrowing beyond a certain level, and to give debtholders a veto over
cenain extraordinary actions. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &:Jerold B. Warner, On FiMncial Contmcting: An Analysis of Btmd Covenants, 7 j. FIN. EcoN. 117, ISl-35, 18688 (1979). Another means of reducing the costs of conftict are for corporations
to issue convenible debt. /d. at 141. Convenible debt reduces the incentive for
firms to pursue asset substitution because convenible debtholders have the right
to conven their debt claims into stock and share in the transfer of wealth to equityholders. Id. This reduces the opponunities for existing equityholders to transfer wealth by increasing risk. R1chard C. Green, Jnwstmmt Incmtiws, Debt and
Wtmtmts, 15 j. FIN. EcoN. 115, 124-29 (1984): Smith&: Warner, supra, at 140-42.
Another means of reducing confticts is through the issuance of callable bonds,
which reduce the underinvestment problem, the tendency of levered firms to reject profitable but low-risk projects that primarily benefit debtholders. Smith &:
Warner, supra, at 142-48. By calling the bonds, the equityholders can limit the
debtholders' benefit to the call premium. Zvi Bodie &: Roben A. Taggart, Jr.,
FutJm Inwstmmt Opportunitia and tJae Valw of tJae Call Provision on a Bond, 55 J. FIN.
1187 (1978); janet S. Thatcher, The Choice of Call Provision TtmLS: Evidence of the
&Utmu of Agency Costs of Debt, 40 j. FIN. 549, 550-51 (1985). The equityholders
can capture the rest of the gain from undertaking a profitable, low-risk project.
Bodie&: Taggart, supra, at 1188; Smith&: Warner, supra, at 143; Thatcher, supra,
at 150-51. These actions, however, are cosdy and only mitigate the cost of confticts, without eliminating them.
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The corporation achieves its optimal capital structure when the
additional tax shield benefits equal the additional financial distress
costs at the margin. Thus, each corporation in the economy has
an optimal capital structure. 8 7
How a corporation should set its capital structure is illustrated in Figure 1.88 Figure 1 also shows the potential net gain
from leverage. The downward sloping line in that figure is the
expected realizable tax shield on each additional dollar of debt.
That line, the marginal benefit of additional debt, slopes downward to reflect the increased probability of suspending or losing
interest deductions as leverage increases. The upward sloping
line, the marginal cost of debt, is the sum of the extra tax investors
paid on interest over equity income plus the net expected financial
distress costs of leverage. This curve slopes up to reflect the increased probability of financial distress and bankruptcy as leverage
increases.89 The intersection of the two curves represents the optimal amount of debt. At this point, the marginal benefit from an
additional dollar of debt, the present value of the expected tax
shield, just equals the marginal cost, the sum of the extra tax investors paid on debt and the increased costs of bankruptcy and
financial distress. The area enclosed by the marginal benefit and
marginal cost curves represents the potential gain to the corporation from an optimal capital structure.90
87. BREALEY lc MYERS, .sr.1f1RJ note 21, at 431-33.
88. The diagram is based on one by Stewart Myers. Stewan C. Myers, Tht
Search for Opliftud Capital Stnldrm, I MIDLAND CoRP. FrN.j. 6, II (1984) [hereinafter Myers, Opliftud Capital Stnu:ture].
89. The cost of using debt instead of equity will include the extra tax paid by
investors on interest income relative to that paid on ~uity income. Because the
potential holders of a corporation's securities extend beyond its current securityholders to investors generally, this portion of the firm's supply curve is
horizontal.
In addition, if debt is confined to straight debt, then replacing a dollar of
debt with a dollar of equity will increase the corporation's payout. If the demand
for internal financing is fixed, because retained earnings are taxed more favorably than dividends, the corporation should pay a smaller dividend.
90. The theory of corporate capital structure sketched out in the text is
called the static trade-off theory because capital structure is determined by balancing the tax benefits of leverage against the non-tax costs and immediately
moving to the static optimum. The static trade-off theory is not the only theory
that has been offered to explain corporate capital structure. Commentators have
surveyed non-tax theories of corporate capital structure. See, e.g., Milton Harris
lc Anur Raviv, Till Tlwry of Capital Stnldrm, 46 J. FrN. 297 (1991) (discussing
various theories of explaining corporate capital structure).
For sometime financial economists have recognized that capital structure
changes, because they are responses to changes in the firm's current and expected condition, can impan information to investors if insiders are privy to information not available to the market in general. Stephen A. Ross, Tht
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The corporate interest deduction encourages corporations to
Determination of Finmu:ial Strudurt: The lf!Uf&tiw-Signalling .tlpproacl&, 8 BELLj. EcoN.
23, 27-38 (1977). Such actions are valuable as signals because of the underlying
conditions they imply. /d. For example, increasing leverage signals an increase
in expected earnings because if the increased earnings do not materialize, the
corporation is bankrupt and the management out of work. /d.
The leading signaling theory of corporate capital structure is the pecking
order theory. This theory starts with the assumption that managers do not strive
for optimal financing decisions, but instead follow the path of least resistance.
According to the pecking order theory, corporations prefer internal financing,
and they establish their target dividend policy in order to increase the likelihood
of being able to use internal financing. If external financing is required, corporations prefer to issue safe securities. Tilat is, they will issue straight debt before
convertible debt and convertible debt before equity. Stewart Myers and Nicholas
Majluf have shown that this seemingly illogical theory can follow from rational
economic behavior when there is asymmetric information, so capital structure
decisions are useful signals. Stewart C. Myers 8c Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporau
Financing and lnwstmmt Decisions When Firms Haw lriformation Jnwstors Do Not Haw,
13 j. FIN. EcoN. 187, 198-210 (1984); S« Harris & Raviv, SUfmJ, at 306-15, 341
(discussing extensions, criticisms and evidence for this model). This model
seems to have good predictive power. MAsuus, suJWa note 62, at 90-91. It, however, is not inconsistent with a richer statement of the trade-off theory, which
recognizes that firms do not immediately adjust their capital structure to the
static optimum because of the information content of capital structure decisions
but that the speed of adjustment depends on the relative costs and benefits of
. deviations from that optimum. See Edwin 0~ Fischer et. al., Dynamic lApital Structure Cl&oices: Tl&eory and Tests, 44 J. FIN. 19, 21-33 (1989); Abolhassanjalilvand &
Robert S. Harris, Corporau Bthavitw in Adjusting to Capital Strudure and Dividend
Targets: An Ecorurmetric Study, 39 J. FIN. 127, 128-29, l!J9-42 (1984).
It might be thought that the misallocation of capital within the corporate
sector identified in this Article depends on the validity of the static trade-off theory of corporate capital structure. However, the rejection of the static trade-off
theory would not imply the absence of the distortion; it is only under very restrictive conditions that the misallocation would not exist.
First, the capital misallocation still exists with a richer statement of the tradeoff theory. If the shift to an optimal capital structure is not immediate, but the
speed of adjustment depends on the relative costs and benefits of deviations,
then the posited distortions will exist, although their magnitude will be less.
Stewart Myers, the author of both the static tradeoff theory and the pecking order
theory, and now a leading critic of the former, suggests the latter is incomplete
without the former. I...AxsHMI SHYAM-SUNDER 8c STEWART MYERS, TESTING STATIC
TRADE-OFF AGAINST PEcKING ORDER MODELS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 5 n.6
(Working Paper, 1992). Moreover, the richer trade-off theory introduces a distortion across corporations. Under the static trade-off theory, the value of a project depends on its ability to support leverage, which is largely identical across
firms. Under richer theories, the debt a project supports can vary across corporations. Thus, the corporation that finds a project most valuable might not be the
one for which it has the highest positive net present value, but merely the one
that is moving most rapidly towards a more levered capital structure.
Second, the distortion still exists if capital structure is independent of the
costs and benefits of being away from the optimum. The static trade-off theory
posits that firm capital structure is a function of certain economic variables. Accordingly, the theory is wrong if corporate capital structure is a function of other
economic variables or is independent of such factors. Thus, both the static and
richer trade-off theories are wrong if capital structure is independent of the posited economic variables. This suggests not that corporate capital structure is ran-
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make a trade-off when they set capital structure. Corporations
balance leverage's falling marginal tax shield against increased financial distress costs. Existing tax law, thus, encourages corporations to balance tax savings against increased financial distress
costs.
If there were no tax advantage associated with debt, then the
corporation, in setting its capital structure, would seek to minimize the agency costs of debt and equity. 91 However, in the presdom but that the factors that determine capital structure are not those that
influence the value of leverage.
A simple demonstration that the distonion still exists if capital structure is
independent of the variables posited by the static trade-off theory can be given by
assuming that all firms have the same leverage. Under this assumption, there will
be differences in the cost of capital between firms (even ignoring differences in
systematic risk), as long as investors are not consistently fooled by capital structure and investment decisions are made rationally. Once again, those corporations that are better able to make use of the interest deductions will have a lower
cost of capital and therefore a lower hurdle rate for projects. The projects that
will be favored are still those with low unsystematic risk. Similarly, the cost of
capital will be higher where the agency costs of debt are higher. Thus, corporations with high agency costs from debt will have a higher cost of capital and
projects that impose high agency costs on debt will have high hurdle rates. In
other words, there will be a bias against high-risk, high-growth projects using
intangible assets.
In order to eliminate the capital misallocation, it is not enough for capital
structure to be independent of the posited economic factors. Instead, the relationships must be the reverse of those posited by the static trade-off theory.
There is neither evidence nor theory to suppon such an arrangement.
Finally, rejecting the static trade-off theory can lead to a decrease or an increase in the magnitude of the misallocation. This is easy to see when capital
structure is the same for all corporations. Assume all corporations can be divided into two groups: those that the static trade-off theory predicts would have
low leverage and those that would have high leverage. If all corporations had the
low leverage capital structure, the predicted low leverage firms would receive
their maximum benefits from leverage but the predicted high leverage firms
would achieve less than their optimal benefits from leverage. Because the predicted high leverage corporations are receiving a smaller advantage, the misallocation would be less than implied by theory. Alternatively, if all corporations had
the high leverage capital structure, the predicted low leverage firms would receive less than their optimal benefits. This exaggerates the advantage enjoyed by
high-leverage firms and increases the misallocation.
91. Equity imposes agency costs that debt can sometimes mitigate. Payments to equityholders are discretionary. When these payments are made, managers have fewer resources under their control, reducing their power and
increasing the probability that they will have to undergo the monitoring of the
capital markets that occurs when firms raise new capital. Thus, managers have
an incentive to retain earnings and increase the size of operations past the point
at which positive net present value projects are available.
Michael jensen argues that debt can be used to restrain these conflicts.
Michael C. jensen, lfprcy CAsts of Pm Cash Flow, Cl1rporaU Fifuma and Takeovm, 52
Ar.c. EcoN. REV. 525, 528-24 (1986). jensen defines free cash flow as the cash
flow the firm generates in excess of the cash required to fund all positive net
present value projects. /d. at 525. Debt constrains the conflicts between managers and investors over free cash flow by taking away managers' control over free
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ence of a classical tax regime with an interest deduction
corporations balance the increase in financial distress costs fro~
greater leverage against the reduction in taxes.92 Thus, the corporate interest deduction forces corporations to accept greater financial distress costs than they otherwise would. Viewed from the
perspective of the economy, the current tax system is inefficient.
The tax saving is a transfer from the federal treasury to the corporation's stakeholders, but the additional financial distress costs are
real economic costs.95 Thus, the classical two-level tax on corporate income with a deduction for interest imposes additional financial distress costs on the economy.94 This is undesirable because
it reduces national income.
Ill.

IMPACT OF CORPORATE INTEREST DEDUCTION ON INVESTMENT

The previous section described how corporations set their
cash flow. Stt id. To spend additional money. the managers must subject their
plans to the discipline of the capital market. Jd. at 528-24.
Critics argue that the usefulness of debt as a disciplining mechanism is limited. Genler Be Hubbard, supra note 50, at 51-55. For example, debt is a poor
mechanism for inducing managers to bear residual risk for their actions when
cash flow is highly variable. /d. at 51.
92. If debt and equity were taxed equally, capital structure would be chosen
to maximize firm v~lue or equivalently minimize the cost of capital. Leverage
would, then, depend on the relative financial distress costs of debt and equity.
However, given the tax advantage to debt provided by current law, the capital
structure that minimizes total financial distress costs is not optimal. Consequently, at the margin, corporations balance the tax advantage of debt against
increased financial distress costs. Thus, corporate leverage would be lower, but
not necessarily zero, if debt and equity were taxed equaUy.
98. Returning to Figure 1. the upper line, the expected realizable tax shield,
slopes down because as leverage increases the likelihood that deductions will be
suspended or lost increases, thereby decreasing the value of the marginal deduction. This curve represents a transfer payment from the government to the corporation. The lower line in Figure I is the sum of the extra tax paid by investors
on interest over equity income plus the net expected bankruptcy and financial
distress costs of leverage. The former is horizontal, independent of the firm's
leverage, because the additional investor-level tax on interest depends on the
marginal taxpayer's tax bracket, which is not affected by the financial policies of
any single firm. (This assumes that interest paying debt replaces an equivalent
amount of dividends, so that there is no additional investor-level tax.) The latter
slopes up, reflecting the increased probability of financial distress and bankruptcy from additional leverage. Once again, the former is a transfer payment
between the government and the corporation. The latter, however, is not. The
bankruptcy and financial distress costs are real resource costs incurred by the
corporation.
94. Roger H. Gordon Be Bunon G. Malkiel, Corpomtitm FiruJ11£t, in How
TAXES AFFEcr EcoNOMIC BEHAVIOR 181. 172 (Henry Aaron &joseph Pechman
eds., 1981) (estimating that welfare loss from encouraging debt over equity was
$8.2 billion in 1975). Their estimate amounts to about .24% of consumption and
about .2,0 of gross national product. GRAVELLE, SUfWa note 20, at 25.
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target debt-to-equity ratios. Essentially, they balance the tax advantages of debt against the costs of financial distress. When
these two are equal at the margin, the corporation has achieved its
optimal debt-to-equity ratio. If all corporations saw the value of
their interest tax shields decline and financial distress costs rise at
the same rate when leverage increased, they would all have the
same debt-to-equity ratio and they would all e.Yoy the same benefit from leverage. However, by virtue of their different activities,
the rate at which interest tax shields decline and financial distress
costs increase with leverage varies across corporations. Consequently, corporations have different capital structures; therefore,
some corporations benefit more than others from the lower tax on
debt.
This section argues that because of the preferential tax treatment of corporate debt, capital will be drawn into corporations
with high debt capacities and away from corporations with low
debt capacities. It also argues that this misallocation is harmful to
the economy because it diverts investment away from valuable
projects that cannot support a lot of debt to less valuable projects
that can support more debt.
According to a 1991 report written by Jane Gravelle and issued by the Congressional Research Service, the total effective
federal income tax on corporate equity is 42%, taking into account both shareholder and corporate level taxes. 95 Gravelle further estimates that the total effective federal income tax on
corporate debt is minw 10%.96 Using these values, the following
example illustrates how the classical corporate income tax with an
95. The number is derived &om a simulation. It assumes a rate of inflation
of 4%, a 57% dividend payout rate, an average holding period of seven years,
that two-thirds of capital gains are de(erred until death and that SO% of assets
are held by tax-exempt entities. GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 8-9.
96. /d. at 10. The negative corporate tax rate on debt, which means that
debt is subsidized by the tax system, arises because corporations can deduct both
the real interest rate and the inflation premium and because borrowers' tax rates
generally exceed those of lenders. /d.
97. Merck, one of the leaders in the pharmaceutical industry, has virtually
no debt. BREALEY & Mnas, supra note 21, at424-25.
98. Because this example concentrates on the effect of taxes, not risk, the
project is assumed to have no systematic risk. In the language of finance, beta ()
ts zero. This assumption simplifies the exposition because the after-tax required
return on equity is independent of leverage. However, the distortion from the
interest deduction does not d~d upon the assumption. S. BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 21, at405-07 (descnbing Modigliani-Miller Theorem 11--expected return on equity oflevered firm increases in proportion to debt-equity ratio); Ross
& WESTERnELD, supra note 21, at 425-27 (same).
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Dollars
Marginal Benefit-

Expected Realizable Tax Shield

Potential

Gain

Leverage
FIGURE I
THE GAIN FROM OPTIMAL CORPORATE LEVERAGE

interest deduction misallocates capital through its impact on the
cost of capital.
Assume that corporations in the pharmaceutical industry have
no debt because of high financial distress costs.97 These corpora99. The value 1!.79% is calculated as follows: 8%/(1 - .42).
100. The value 10.53% is calculated as follows: .5 x 8%/(1 - (-.1)) + .5
X 8%/(1 - .42). The two .5s represent the fraction of the firm's capital in debt
and equity.
10 1. The proper means of capital budgeting is to use the net present value
(NPV) rule. This rule requires that future cash flows of a proposed project be
estimated and then discounted using a discount rate appropriate for the project's
risk. The initial investment is then subtracted from the present value of the future cash flows. If the difference, the NPV, is positive, the project should be
accepted, and conversely. The NPV rule is the proper technique for capital
budgeting, because it reduces to accepting a project if it increases net worth, and
conversely. BREALEY Be MYERS, supra note 21, at ch. 2; Ross Be WESTERnELD, supra
note 21, at ch. 5.
The internal rate of return (IRR) rule requires that the future cash flows be
estimated. The IRR is the rate of return for which the NPV is zero. The IRR rule
calls for the project to be accepted if the IRR exceeds the hurdle rate, the minimally acceptable rate of return, and conversely. Under normal circumstances,
the two rules produce identical results. However, under other circumstances, the
IRR rule yields misleading results, whereas the NPV rule always produces the
correct result. BREALEY Be MYERS, supra note 21, ch. 4; Ross Be WESTERnELD,
supra note 21, at ch. 6.
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tions, which have many opportunities for profitable investment,
want to avoid the asset substitution and underinvestment
problems. They also want to avoid bankruptcy because it would
be costly to take a pharmaceutical company through bankruptcy.
These corporations use little tangible capital, relying heavily on
the accumulated knowledge of their employees who develop and
market new drugs. If the employees' jobs are not secure, they will
leave. Assume that corporations in the cement industry have a
debt-to-equity ratio of one-to-one. They have more leverage than
corporations in the phannaceutical industry because debt imposes
lower financial distress costs. There are few opportunities for asset substitution or underinvestment in the cement industry because the major asset, the plant, is committed to cement
production. In addition, if a cement producer goes bankrupt, it is
easy for another producer to takeover the plant because cement
plants are very similar.9s
Assume further that the after-tax rate of return required by
investors in both debt and equity is 8%, that the effective total
federal income tax rate on equity is 42% and on debt is minus
10%. This implies that the cost of capital to pharmaceutical companies is 13.79%,99 whereas the cost of capital to cement companies is only 10.53%. 100 A finn's cost of capital is the pre-tax
return it must earn to cover the required after-tax return of its
investors. The cost of capital is sometimes referred to as the hurdle rate for investments because a firm will increase the value of its
outstanding securities if it selects projects with a return exceeding
its cost of capital and it will decrease the value of its securities if it
selects projects with a lower return.IoJ
Because the investment policy that maximizes the finn's value
is to undertake all projects that have an expected rate of return
above its cost of capital but to refuse all projects that have an expected return below its cost of capital, the pharmaceutical company will only invest in projects with an expected return above
13.79%. However, the cement company will pursue projects
above its hurdle rate of 10.53%.
Assume that there are two S1 million projects under consideration. A pharmaceutical company is considering investing in a
new drug and estimates that the project would return 13%, and a
cement company is considering a new plant, which it estimates
would yield 11%. (Both estimates are before any taxes.) From the
perspective of maximizing domestic wealth, an investment in the
new drug is preferable to an investment in a new cement plant.
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However, the investment in a new cement plant will occur because
its 11% return exceeds the cement company's 10.53% hurdle
rate, whereas the investment in the new drug will be rejected because its 13% return is below the pharmaceutical company's
13.79% hurdle rate.
The reason for this result is the much higher tax burden imposed on the pharmaceutical company's project. Because the
drug company cannot support the new project with debt but instead must use equity, the investment in a new drug is, in effect,
subject to a higher tax rate. 102 The income from the drug investment is effectively subject to a 42% combined corporate and personal tax rate, whereas the investment in a new cement plant is
subject to an effective total tax rate of 24%. 105
More genen.lly, as the amount of debt in the capital structure
increases, the corporation's effective total tax rate and cost of capital decline. The effective total tax rate approaches minus 10% and
the cost of capital approaches 7.27% as ·leverage approaches
100%. Because there are fewer projects with an expected return
above 13.79% than with an expected return above 10.53%, or
7.27%, the classical corporate tax discourages investment in corporations with low leverage and encourages investment in corporations with high leverage. lOt
Differences in the cost of capital lead to a misallocation of
capital within the corporate sector. Projects with a large debt capacity have a lower hurdle rate than projects with a small capacity.
Thus, some of the latter are foregone whereas the former with
lower rates of return are undertaken. As a consequence, too many
resources will be invested in projects that can support a lot of debt
and too few resources in projects that cannot support as much
debt. 105 Expressed in slightly different language, the existing
102. The example suggests that one way for corporations to respond to the
advantages of debt is to increase their leverage. However, the discussions of
excess tax shields and financial distress in the previous section showed that not
all corporations can increase their leverage as easily. Corporations for which leverage as expensive will have less debt and higher capital costs. These corporations will have to be more selective in approving investment projects.
lOS. The 24% effective total tax rate is calculated as follows: (10.58% 8%)/10.58%.
104. The difference in the cost of capital is an approximate measure of the
difference in the true cost of investment. It ignores the declining value of the tax
shield and the costs of financial distress. The exact measure is given as in Figure
I. Unfonunately, there are no simple methods for measuring the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves.
105. In general, corporations that are unlikely to have excess losses and will
suffer only small declines in value in the event of bankruptcy or financial distress
tax
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classical corporate tax with an interest deduction taxes projects in
inverse proportion to their capacity for debt. The harm from this
effect is that it causes some projects to be adopted that have a
lower pre-tax net present value than some of the projects it causes
to be turned down. By reducing the return on investment, this
effect makes the nation poorer and reduces its rate of income
growth.
How important are these differences in rates of return
brought about by distortions? Before dismissing the differences
as small and therefore insignificant, it is important to recall the
effect of compound interest. The difference between accumulation at 8% and at 10% is only 2% per year. However, $1 invested
over a period of twenty years with annual reinvestment grows to
only $4.66 at 8%. but it reaches $6.73 at 10%, a 44% difference in
accumulated value. This difference continues to grow as the reinvestment horizon increases. 106 Thus, differences in hurdle rates
for investment in different sectors, brought about by the tax-favored treatment of debt, can over time result in large differences
in value.l 07 Moreover, the differences are pure social gains that
can result from shifting investment at the margin from tax-advantaged projects to tax-disadvantaged projects.
A second reason to believe that the difference is important is
provided by a study from Mervyn King and Don Fullerton on the
taxation of income from capital and economic growth.• 08 King
and Fullerton conclude that the variance in tax rates throughout
the economy across investments, and not the average level of tax
will have more leverage than corporations that are likely to have excess losses
and will suffer large declines in value when they experience bankruptcy or financial distress. Expressing this result in terms of Figure 1, the size of the enclosed
region will differ across corporations. How large the potential gain from corporate borrowing is will depend on the factors previously described: the probability
of being able to use the mterest deduction and the loss in value that would result
from financial distress or bankruptcy. Depending on these factors, a corporation
will have a large or a small potential gain from leverage. If its potential gain is
large relative to that of other corporations, and the corporation takes advantage
of the opportunity by issuing nearly the optimal amount of debt, then it will receive an advantage through the interest deduction. Alternatively, if its potential
gain is small, then it will be disadvantaged by the interest deduction.
106. Mter 50 years, the accumulated value is 150% greater with the higher
rate ofretum. The investment is worth $46.90 at 8% compared with $117.59 at
10%.
107. See David F. Bradford,/ssiiiS in till Design of Savings and lnwslmmllnuntiws, in DEPRECIATION, INFLATION, AND 1;HE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL
15, 25 (Charles R. Hulten ed., 1981).
108. See MERVYN A. KING Be DoN Fuu..ERTON, THE TAXATION oF INcoME
FROM CAPITAL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY (1984).
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rates, is most closely related to low growth rates.I09 Although the
distortion identified in this Article is not the only difference in effective tax rates in the U.S. economy, if King and Fullerton are
correct in their conclusion, then eliminating such distortions is
likely to have a high payoff.
IV.

DISADVANTAGED ACTIVITIES

The corporate tax literature has long recognized the advantage afforded debt over equity financing. 110 Although corporations might be legally free to set any capital structure (at least
before providing restrictive covenants), they are not economically
free. There are significant economic constraints on capital structure. Moreover, and most important, the constraints are not the
same for all corporations. Accordingly, those corporations that
can best take advantage of the differential tax treatment will benefit the most. Thus, the harm from the differential treatment of
various kinds of corporate financings is not that some forms of
financing are encouraged over other forms but that corporate activities are encouraged or discouraged based on their affinity for
d._ifferent kinds of financing.
A. Ec07Winic Variables Affecting Debt Capacity

The argument that capital structure decisions are influenced
by economic considerations, such as federal income tax and bankruptcy laws, risk, growth prospects and asset nature; suggests that
corporations within an industry should have similar capital structures. Studies of industry capital structure patterns confirm this
result. 111 The nature of the projects that cannot support a lot of
109. /d. at S02 (noting that Britain has high variance in tax rates and low
growth while Gennany has low variance in tax rate and high growth).
110. Su, '·f·• William D. Andrews, Tax Nlfllrality Ihtwlm Equity arul Dlbt CapittJl, SO WAYNE L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1984). Recently, the literature has recognized
that the advantages are not all one way and commentators have become more
concerned with how the tax law encourages and discourages various forms of
financing. William Andrews, for example, has criticized existing tax law because
it encourages both debt financing over equity financing and retained earnings
over dividend payments accompanied by new issues. /d. at 1058-64. However,
Andrews does not explain why 1t matters if debt is favored over equity. Douglas
A. Kahn, Commmts on "Tax NIUtrtJlity Jhtwlm Equity CapittJl arul Debt", SO WAYNE L.
REV. 1081, 1081-82 (1984) (suggesting that Andrews should explain why favoring debt over equity is problematic). This Article explains the significance or
consequences of favoring debt over equity.
Ill. Several studies have found that there is more variation in mean firm
leverage ratios across industries than within industries. Su M.uuus, supra note
62, at 81. For a discussion of evidence that 6rm leverage ratios tend to cluster
within an industry, see id. at 21-22 (citing CYNTHIA CAMPBELL, INDUSTRY LEVER-
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debt, and are therefore discouraged by the tax law's favoring debt
over equity, are described below.

I. High-Risk Projects Discouraged
The corporate interest deduction discourages investment in
high-risk projects.l 12 This occurs because a. corporation's debt capacity is inversely related to risk, measured by the variance of the
corporation's total returns. Risk discourages leverage in two ways.
First, at any given debt level, the larger the variance in earnings,
the greater the probability that the corporation will not have a tax
liability in a given year. Thus, risk increases the rate at which the
tax shield declines as leverage increases. Second, at any given
debt level, the larger the variance in earnings, the more likely it is
that the corporation will be bankrupt or in financial distress and
suffer the associated costs.••s Thus, increased risk raises the financial distress costs of leverage. Expressed in terms of Figure 1,
increased risk shifts the marginal benefit curve down and the marginal cost curve up, reducing the optimal amount of leverage. Accordingly, the riskier the corporation, the higher its cost of
capital. 114
AGE REGULAilmES: OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCI'URES OR NEUTRAL MUTATIONs? (University of Michigan Working Paper, 1986)). Cynthia Campbell tested the joint
hypotheses that optimal capital structures exist for corporations and that some of
major determinants of optimal leverage are industry-related. CAMPBELL, sufm!..
Campbell reports that there is a strong positive reaction in the corporation's
stock price when it adjusts its leverage towards the industry mean and a negative
reaction when it moves away. /d.
112. The claim that the corporate interest deduction discourages investment in high-risk projects is based on a comparison of the existing tax system to
one without the interest deduction but with a lower corporate tax rate, so that the
net tax revenue is the same, and which is otherwise identical to the current system. The comparison is not between the current tax system and a no-tax world.
Because of the numerous distortions created by the existing tax system, that comparison would be extremely difficult to make.
liS. Firms that employ certain production technologies and produce certain
products are associated with greater earnings variability than are other firms.
MAsuus, supra note 62, at SI. Under reasonable conditions this will lead to a
greater risk of bankruptcy. /d. However, the relationship between earnings variability and firm bankruptcy rates has not been documented. /d. at !2.
114. Evidence that firm volatility is invenely related to leverage is mixed.
Michael Bradley, Gregg jarrell and E. Han Kim found a strong negative relationship between leverage and firm-specific risk. Michael Bradley et al., On till Existence of an Optimal Capital Structrm: Theory tmd Evidence, 39 J. FJN. 857, 87!-74
(1984). In contrast, Michael Long and Ileen Malitz found a significant positive
relationship between firm-specific risk and leverage. Michael S. Long Be Ileen B.
Malitz, lnwstmmt Ptztlems tmd Firumci41 i..nJmJp, in CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUC·
TURES IN THE UNITED STATES !25, 526 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 1985) In a
third study, Sheridan Titman and Roberto Wessels found a negative relationship
between leverage and firm-specific risk, but the coefficient was not significant.
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Among two projects with the same before-tax net present
value, the riskier project will not support as much debt. Consequently, because the effective tax rate on the riskier project will
exceed that on the less risky project, the riskier project will yield a
lower after-tax return. Thus, the corporate interest deduction
causes U.S. corporations to undertake more low-risk projects and
fewer high-risk projects than they might otherwise undertake.
There are additional distortiops from the corporate interest
deduction because of the bias against risk. The deduction encourages corporations to diversify. Other things being equal, a diversified corporation has less earnings variance. Consequently, a
diversified corporation can employ more leverage and have a
lower cost of capital. 115 ·
By encouraging corporations to diversify, the corporate interest deduction spurs conglomerate mergers. 116 When two corporations whose returns are not strongly correlated merge, they will
reduce the variation in their total returns. This increases their
debt capacity, thereby reducing their combined taxes and lowering their cost of capital. The tax savings from a conglomerate
l!lerger can induce corporations to merge that otherwise would
not. In effect, such corporations are trading economic inefficiencies for tax savings. Thus, the corporate interest deduction encourages inefficient conglomerate mergers. 117 This reduces
Sheridan Titman Be Roberto Wessels, The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice, 43
The evidence is compiled and discussed by Ronald Masulis, who concluded that "[s]upport is found for leverage being negatively influenced by the total risk of the firm's assets." MAsuus, supra note 62, at 90. The
argument that volatility is inversely related to leverage is based on the assumption that bankruptcy costs are not trivial. Volatility is a proxy for the probability
of bankruptcy. Evidence on the relationship between leverage and the
probability of bankruptcy was collected by Richard Castanias, who found that
industry bankruptcy rates maintain stability over time and that firms in industries
with higher bankruptcy rates tend to have lower leverage ratios. Richard Castanias, &nlrruptcy Rislr and Dpti'IIUJI Capillll Structure, !8J. FIN. 1617, 1629 (1983).
115. See SAMAN MAJD Be STEWART C. MYERS, VALUING mE GovERNMENT's
TAX CLAIM ON RISKY CoRPORATE AssETS 22 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1553, 1985) (noting that undiversified firms are at
significant tax disadvantage, especially for high-risk assets).
116. Without the corporate interest deduction, there would still be a taxdriven incentive to merge because of incomplete-loss offsets. /d. at 17-22. However, the incentives would be weaker without the deduction.
117. Whether greater concentration in the form of conglomerate mergers
encourages or discourages innovation and the welfare ·implications of these effects are the subject of much debate. See DENNIS W. CARLTON Be jEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 20 (1990); SCHERER 8c Ross,
supra note 17, at ch. 17 (citing other relevant works and discussing the effects of
greater concentration). There is a rich economic literature on how market structure affects RileD spending that can be traced to joseph Schumpeter. See josEPH

J. FIN. 1, 11-15 (1988).
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national income.
In addition, the corporate interest deduction gives a conglomerate an advantage over a small corporation in pursuing a
project. 118 Between two corporations, other things being equal,
the more diversified corporation can support more debt, so it will
have a lower cost of capital for the project. As a consequence, the
corporation undertaking a project might not be the most efficient,
but merely the one with the largest tax advantage.
2. Growth Projects Discouraged

The corporate interest deduction discourages investment in
projects with opportunities for further profitable investment. The
market value of a corporation is the market value of its assets in
place plus the market value of its future growth opportunities.
What is crucial about the latter is that it depends on future discretionary investment. 11 9 These opportunities can be of any kind. As
examples, Stewart Myers lists advertising, incorporating new technologies, improving efficiency, and recruiting and training
employees. 120
Because of the underinvestment problem, increased leverage
reduces the likelihood that future profitable investments will be
made. Accordingly, corporations with good investment prospects
avoid leverage, which translates into a high effective tax rate and
therefore a high cost of capital. As a consequence, some highgrowth investments will be passed over in favor of low-growth investments.l21 Thus, the corporate interest deduction diverts capiScHuMPETER, CAPITAUSM, SociAusM AND DEMOCRACY (1942). Schumpeter argued that monopolistic firms would set inefficiently high prices but would innovate faster because of better access to capital, superior risk poolinJ. and
economies of scale in RBcD. /d. at 106. Critics argue that the greater flexibility of
small outfits is more conducive to R&:D than the bureaucracies of large
organizations.
118. The corporate loss limitations also have these effects. MAJD &: MYERS,
supra note 115, at 20-21 (demonstrating effects of loss-offsets on risk-taking);
Mark Campisano &: Roberta Romano, R«rrllffing Losses: The Cau for FuU Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 709, 722-50 (1981) (same);j.E. Stiglitz, The Eff«ts of Income, Wtallh, and C/Jpi14l Gains Taxalilm on Rislr-Tding, 85 QJ. EcoN. 265, 275-79
(1969) (same).
119. In the language of finance, the opponunity is an option that expires
without being exercised if the necessary investment is not later made.
120. Myers, Ct1rJ1orate ~. mpra note 79, at 156 (noting continual effons towards these activities requiring discretionary investment).
121. Corporations with numerous investment possibilities are also more
susceptible to the asset substitution problem. Because low leverage reduces the
opponunity for asset substitution, these corporations have an additional reason
to avoid leverage. This reinforces the effect described in the text.
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tal away from projects with growth opportunities towards projects
that rely more heavily on assets in place.•22
3. Investment in Intangible Assets Discouraged
The corporate interest deduction discourages investment in
assets that lose value sharply in times of bankruptcy or financial
distress. Stewart Myers argues that the loss in value is greatest for
intangible assets that are linked to the firm as a going concem.•2s
The examples that he gives are advertising, technology, research
and development (R&D), and human capital.l 24 Sheridan Titman
argues that the loss of value is directly related to asset uniqueness
and offers similar examples.•25
Corporations that use intangible and unique assets avoid leverage because of the high costs of financial distress. Accordingly,
they have a high effective total tax rate and a high cost of capital.
This discourages investment in activities that employ intangible or
unique assets. 126
122. The only study to test the hypothesis that growth is inversely related to
leverage found the hypothesized negative relation, although it was not statistically significant. Titman Be Wessels, supm note 114, at 11-15.
12S. Myers, OptirtUJI Capital Structure, sujmJ note 88, at 12-15. See gmeraUy
George Mundstock, Tamtion of Business Intangible Cajlital, IS5 U. PA. L. REv. 1179
(1987) (discussing taxation of corporate intangible assets).
124. Myers, OptirtUJI Cajlital Structure, supra note 88, at 12-15. Bronwyn Hall
has documented the negative correlation between corporate leverage ratios and
R&D. BRONWYN H. HALL, INVESTMENT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE
FIRM LEVEL: DoES THE SouRCE OF FINANCING MATrER? I, 24 tbU (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4096, 1992).
125. Titman, supra note 82, at 1S7; Titman Be Wessels, supm note 114, at 5.
126. There is evidence supporting the inverse relationship between leverage
and the reliance on intangible assets. Michael Long and Ileen Malitz found a
positive relationship between capital expenditures and leverage. Michael S.
Long Be Ileen B. Malitz, The Investment-Financing Nexw: Some Empirical Evidence, S
MIDLAND CoRP. FIN. j. 5S, 57-59 (1985) (hereinafter Long 8c Malitz, /nveslmmiFinancing Nexw]. Because capital expenditure is a proxy for tangible capital,
Long and Malitz interpret this finding as support for the hypothesized negative
relationship between intangible assets and leverage. /d. Further support for this
position comes from a study by Michael Bradley, Gregg jarrell and E. Han Kim,
who found a negative relationship between advertising and R&D expenditures
and leverage. Bradley et al., supm note 114, at 875-76. Sheridan Titman and
Roberto Wessels found a positive but insignificant relationship between tangible
assets and leverage. Titman Be Wessels, supm note 114, at 11-15. They did, however, find a statistically significant inverse relationship between asset uniqueness
and leverage. /d.
The difficulty in finding a strong relationship between intangible assets and
leverage is probably a result of the importance of nondebt tax shields. Harry
DeAngelo and Ronald Masulis observed that nondebt tax shields, such as depreciation, depletion allowances, foreign and investment tax credits, influence the
demand for debt. DeAngelo Be Masulis, supm note 61, at 12-19. As long as excess tax shields are difficult to transfer, firms with nondebt tax shields that are
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The Nature of the Bias

The biases against growth, risk-taking and intangible assets
translate into biases against high-tech industries. emerging technologies. innovative production and management practices and
long-term noncontractual relations.
Although there are no commonly accepted principles for
characterizing high-tech industries. "[t]hese industries are said to
make significant use of scientific. engineering. and other technical
personnel and to invest in a greater than average level of R&D
funding ... 127 Thus. one characteristic of high-tech industries is
their heavy use of intangible capital. which cannot support a lot of
debt because it tends to depreciate rapidly when the corporation is
in financial distress. In addition, many high-tech goods have short
product life cycles. For example, the average product life cycle
for dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips is mree
years. 128 Short product life cycles suggest numerous growth opportunities and high risk. Competitive pressures, to innovate discourage leverage because leverage increases the opportunities for
asset substitution and underinvestment. A corollary of the competitive pressures to innovate is that failures sometimes occur.
which suggests that the industries are risky. Thus. because the
factors identified here as discouraged by the corporate interest deduction-high-risk. good growth prospects and use of intangible
assets-are characteristic of high-tech industries, the corporate interest deduction discourages investment in such industries.
The corporate interest deduction also discourages investment
in emerging technologies and new production techniques. By definition. these are growth opportunities that cannot support much
debt. They also rely heavily on intangible assets, although they
might or might not be very risky. Finally. the corporate interest
deduction discourages investment in noncontractual long-term
large relative to expected earnings before interest and taxes wiD issue less debt.
/d. One implication of DeAngelo and Masulis' result is that it suggests that capital structure consideration~ mitigate but do not eliminate the income-nature--as
opposed to the consumption-nature--of the federal corporate income tax. The
disadvantage that results from not being able to take currendy a full deduction
for certain expenditures but being required to depreciate or even defer the recovery until disposition is the reduction in the present value of deductions.
Thus, expected income before interest and taxes is larger when expenditures
cannot be currendy deducted. This increases the corporation's capacity for debt,
which can partly compensate for the reduced value of deferred deductions. Su
genmUiy Edwardj. McCaffery, Tt»C Policy Undlra H1brid Iru:om~-Consumptilm Tt»C, 70
TEX. L. REv. 1145 (1992) (discussing income/consumption tax debate).
127. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 235 (1989).
128. /d. at 237.
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understandings between the firm and its employees, suppliers and
consumers. 129
V.

THE CASE FOR REMEDYING THE DISTORTION

Because any tax other than a head tax creates distortions,uo
the mere identification of a distortion cannot justify its removal. ut
Because the market will still remain distorted if the identified distortion is remedied, the question becomes will reform increase the
total distortion imposed by the entire tax system. 152 Unfortunately, as long as there are other distortions, the general theory of
the second best implies that it is always theoreticaUy possible for the
total distortion to increase or decrease when a single distortion is
removed. Thus, absent a thorough empirical study of the entire
economy, there is no absolute answer. Because ohhe tremendous
difficulty and expense of such studies, especially the trouble in
conducting predictive studies of potential law reform, requiring
them would place a nearly impossible burden on the proponents
of change. Accordingly, in the tax literature, it is common for pro129. Such long-term understandings are at the heart of the Japanese
..Keiretsu, a system of interlocking banks and industrial companies. See Ronald j.
Gilson Be Markj. Roe, Unllerstanding tlwjapanese Keiretsu: Overlaps &tween Corporate
Govmuma and Jndwtrilll Organization, 102 YALE LJ. 871, 882•95 (199S). It is further worth noting that the six key similarities the MIT Commission on Industrial
Productivity finds among best-practice firms, and which it recommends other
firms adopt, are unlikely to support a lot of leverage. These six similarities are:
simultaneous improvement in quality, cost and delivery; closer customer links;
closer supplier links; using technology for strategic advantage; more flexible organization structure; and innovative human resource policies. DERTOuzous ET
AL., supra note 19, at ch. 9. The existing tax law, thus, discourages firms from
adopting these best-practice techniques.
Although not widely accepted, Lawrence Summers and Andrei Shleifer posit
that takeover gains are a redistribution from "stakeholders" to equityholders. See
KRuGMAN, supra note 15, at 159-61. "Stakeholders" are those other than stockholders who have made a long-term commitment to the firm. /d. at 160. Summers and Shleifer argue that these gains are pan of a long-term understanding,
which will be harder to build up in the future. /d. at 160-61. Viewed from this
perspective, the tax advantage of debt increases the incentive for owners to break
these understandings.
ISO. RICHARD MusGRAVE Be PEGGY MusGRAVE, Puauc FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 279 (5th ed. 1989).
lSI. Kahn, supra note 110, at 1081 (stating that "the elimination ofa distortion in a specific area is not a sufficient justification for a proposed change in the
tax law"); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Eifo:ienc1 and lncrnne Tax.es: Tlw ReluJbilitation
of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REv. 97S, 975 (1986) (discussing "propriety of tax
incentives in the federal income tax and the use of economic analysis to examine
questions of concern to academic lawyers").
1!2. The total distortion imposed by taxes, also called the excess burden or
dead-weight loss, measures the loss imposed by taxes from interfering with economic decisions and distorting choices. MusGRAVE Be MusGRAVE, supra note 150,
at 277-80.
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ponents of reform to argue that a distortion biases choice in a way
that is undesirable, that it creates problems of sufficient magnitude to warrant attention, and that it is not likely to interfere with
another choice in a way that will create a large distortion. 155 Furthermore, a good tax system must be built on normative as well as
efficiency values. 154 In this section, I argue that the tax treatments
of debt and equity should be equalized. Having argued above that
choice is biased in an undesirable way, I tum to estimating the
magnitude of the distortion before presenting the argument that a
remedy is likely to cause more good than harm.
A.

Measuring the Capital Misallocation

Michael Long and Ileen Malitz have calculated debt-to-capital
ratios, the face amount of corporate debt as a percentage of invested capital,1 55 on an industry-by-industry basis.• 56 Although
such accounting measures of debt-to-capital ratios are only proxies for actual debt-to-value ratios, these measures provide an idea
of the magnitude of the bias across industries from the tax law's
favorable treatment of corporate debt.l57
Long and Malitz identified sixty-three industries classified by
four digit Standard Industrial Codes (SIC). 158 Because many of
the industries consisted of only a few firms, they reduced their
sample to thirty-nine industries, each with at least eight firms. 159
Long and Malitz found a mean debt-to-capital ratio in the economy of22.4%;140 The five industries with the lowest leverage and
the mean debt-to-capital ratio in these five industries are as follows: cosmetics and toiletries (9%); drugs (10.9%); photographic
US. See Kahn, supra note 110, at 1081-82 (commenting on proposal to eliminate distortion).
U4. MusGRAVE Be MusGRAVE, supra note 150, at ch. U; see also Andrews,
supra note 110, at 1058-59 (discussing relationship between taxation of equity
capital and debt).
U5. Invested capital is calculated as the book value of long-term debt and
equity plus capitalized R&D spending and advertising.
U6. Long Be Malitz,/nvestmmt-Fmancing NtDtUS, sufmJ note 126, at 56-57.
157. It is standard practice to use book value in studies of this son. See, e.g.,
Titman Be Wessels, supra note 114, at 7 (noting that data limitations require use of
book value). Robert Bowman has shown that the correlation between the book
and market value of debt is very large. Roben G. Bowman, Tlte l'lft/Hirl4nu of a
MtZTket-Palue MltiSUmttml of Debt in Assessing Lewroge, 18 j. AcCT. RES. 242 (1980)
(discussing relationship between market risk and financial and accounting
variables).
158. Long Be Malitz,/nvestmmt-FiMncing NtDtUS, sufmJ note 126, at 56-57.
U9. /d.
140. /d. at 57 tbl.2.
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equipment (11.2%); aircraft (13.4%); and radio and television re41
ceiving (14.2%).1 . The five indust?es with the highest leverage
are petroleum refinmg (29.4%); textde mill products (30.8%); paper and allied products (32.2%); blast furnaces and steel (33.7%);
and hydraulic cement (44.1 %).142
To get a rough estimate of the bias, I employed Gravelle's
estimate that the effective total federal income tax rate on corporate equity is 42% and on corporate debt is minus 10% and assumed an after-tax rate of return of 8%. Treating Long and
Malitz's debt-to-capital ratio as an estimate of the actual debt-tovalue ratio, the mean effective total tax rate for U.S. corporations
in the Long and Malitz sample is 30.35%. For the cosmetic and
toiletries industry, the effective total tax rate would be 37.32%,
whereas for the hydraulic cement industry it would be 19.07%.
Thus, this back-of-the-envelope estimate of the bias introduced by
the interest deduction is that the effective total tax rate on the cosmetic and toiletries industry is nearly double that on the hydraulic
cement indus tty.
Table I provides estimates of the effective total tax rate for
the ten industries described above.145
The leverage figures reponed by Long and Malitz are ten
years old. 144 Since that time, aggregate debt-to-equity ratios for
U.S. corporations have increased substantially. 145 According to
John Shoven and joel Waldfogel, by 1986, the book value aggregate debt-to-capital tatio for U.S. corporations was 27.3%.1 46 As141. /d. at tbUt Among 258 U.S. manufacturing industries in 1977, drugs,
aircraft and photographic equipment ranked first, third and fifth based on the
ratio of R&D to sales. SCHERER & Ross, supro. note 17, at 615-16 (citing FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, STATISTICAL REPORT: ANNUAL LINE OF BUSINESS REPORT 21
(1977)). This provides anecdotal suppon for the claim, more thoroughly documented by Bronwyn Hall, that R&D does not suppon a lot of debt. Su BRONWYN
H. HAu., CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT HORIZONS 6-15 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5794, 1991).
142. Long & Malitz, Investmmt-Finanang N~XUS, supra note 126, at 57 tbl.5.
145. I did not calculate costs of capital for the various industries because an
industry's cost of capital is a function not only of its effective total tax rate but
also of its systematic risk. Su BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 21, at 161-65 (discussing relationship between systematic risk and cost of capital); Ross & WESTER·
nELD, supra note 21, at 504-07; su also BuRTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK
DoWN WALL STREET ch. 9 & 10 (5th ed. 1990) (providing non-technical discussion of relationship between systematic risk and cost of capital).
144. Long & Malitz, Investmmt-Finandng N~XUS, supro. note 126, at 157-59
(publishing figures in 1985).
145. john B. Shoven & joel Waldfogel, Introduction and Summary, in DEBT,
TAXEs, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING I, 7-10 (John B. Shoven &joel Waldfogel eds., 1990).
146. /d. at 8.
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TABLE I

MEAN

EFFECTIVE TOTAL TAX RATEs FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES

Industry Name
Cosmetics
Drugs
Photographic Equipment
Aircraft
Radio and TV Receiving
Petroleum Refining
Textile Mill Products
Paper 8c Allied Products
Blast Furnaces 8c Steel
Hydraulic Cement
Economy Wide

Leverage
9.0
10.9
11.2
13.4
14.2
29.4
30.8
32.2
33.7
44.1
22.4

Total Effective
Tax Rate
37.32
36.33
36.18
35.03
34.62
26.71
25.98
25.26
24.48
19.07
30.35

Table I assumes an effective total tax on debt of minus I 0% and an effective total
tax on equity of 42%.

suming Shoven and Waldfogel's numbers are comparable to Long
and Malitz's, this would suggest an increase in the cost from the
lost interest deductions to corporations that eschew leverage.
This is especially likely to be true if the increase in leverage was
not uniform across industries but was greatest for those industries
with relatively high leverage.
The bias across industries understates the biases against
growth, risk and intangible assets. Staid industries contain some
dynamic firms, and dynamic industries contain some staid firms. 147
A single industry debt-to-capital ratio averages across all firms in
an industry, lumping staid and dynamic firms together.l 48 For a
corporation with no debt, such as Merck, the effective total tax
rate would be 42%, which exceeds the mean effective total tax rate
by 11.65%. For a corporation with a debt-to-value ratio of 80%,
the effective total tax rate would be .40%, which is nearly 30%
below the mean.
147. At a glance, the pharmaceutical companies listed in Yalue Lin~: show that
finns that perfonn a lot ofR&:D have little debt, and convenely. I am indebted to
my colleague,
jeff Strnad, for this observation and for the argument that ftows
from
it.
148. There is more variation in capital structure across finns than across
industries.
ing text. For a discussion of this variation, see supra note Ill and accompany-
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. Mic~ael Long .and lleen Malitz sort their sample of 549 corporau?ns m~o quartdes based on leverage. 149 The mean debt-tocapital rataos a.nd corresponding mean effective total tax rates for
the f~ur q~artiles, arranged from least to most highly leveraged,
are g~ven m Table II. Table II demonstrates that looking across
TABLE

II

MEAN EFFECTIVE ToTAL TAX RATEs FOR
BY QUARTILE

U.S.

CoRPORATIONS,

Quartile

Leverage

Mean Total
Effective Tax Rate

1

9.18
19.94
29.12
42.83

37.23
31.63
26.86
19.73

2
3
4

Table II assumes an effective total tax on debt of minus 10% and an effective
total tax on equity of 42%. Corporations are ranked according to leverage.

quartiles of corporations in the U.S. economy, there is wide variation in effective total tax rates as a result of the differential treatment of debt and equity. This strongly suggests that the
differential tax treatment produces a large capital misallocation.
Arguably, the measured bias across corporations also understates the actual bias. For even the dullest corporations have some
vowth opponunities and some assets that will lose value in bankruptcy, and the most dynamic corporations have some dull assets
that can suppon a lot of leverage.
B. Second Best and Other Considerations•5o
The corporate interest deduction misallocates capital, thereby
reducing national wealth, because some projects are pursued with
expected returns below those of other projects that are rejected.
One school of thought in tax policy believes that whenever a distonion is found it should be eliminated. The weight of current
149. Long&: Malitz, Investment-Financing Nt!X.W, supra note 126, at 58 tbl.4.
150. My claim is neither that the corporate interest deduction accounts for
declining U.S. competitiveness nor that eliminating the bias from the deduction
would end that decline. My claim is only that the corporate interest deduction
discourages investment in innovation and risk-taking and that equalizing the
treatment of corporate debt and equity would encourage investment in these
areas, eliminating that distortion.
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scholarly opinion, however, is more reluctant to act. These authors, wary of second-best problems, require more than a showing
of a distortion to justify its elimination. 151
Although there is widespread agreement that the (relative)
competitiveness of U.S. corporations has declined substantially
since the end of the second world war, agreement ends there.
There is substantial debate over the causes of this decline,
whether the causes are benign or indicative of deeply-rooted infirmities in the U.S. economy, whether the decline will stop at parity
or continue, and what, if anything, should be the response.1s2 For
those who believe that reversing declining U.S. competitiveness is
the overriding economic imperative, the case fo~ remedying the
distortion is strong. For these people, any countervailing considerations from remedying the bias are dominated by the need to
encourage investment in new technologies and organizational
practices. However, even for the more skeptical, there are reasons
to believe that the harm from the capital misallocation is large and
that the benefit from eliminating it will exceed the costs. 15s
Because of the general theory of the second best, theory
alone cannot provide a definite answer to the question of whether
placing debt and equity on par will reduce the total distortion fostered by the tax law. This Article identifies three ways in which the
corporate interest deduction biases investment. However, in none
of these three ways is the existing tax law without bias. In each
instance, there are provisions in the law tending to cause biases
both in favor and against such investment. The bias against risk151. SM, e.g., Kahn, mpra note 110, at 1081-82 (suggesting caution in eliminating distonions because eliminating one distonion may create other distortions and discussing propriety of tax incentives in federal income tax and use of
economic analysis to examine questions of concern to academic lawyers).
152. The literature is voluminous and beyond the scope of this Anicle to
review. &1, e.g., PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTuRY ch.
13 (1993) (discussing reasons for United States economic decline and possible
remedies); KEVIN PHILUPS, BolLING POINT: REPUBUCANS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE
0ECUNE OF MIDDLE-ClASS PltOSPERnY 171-75 (1993) (discussing decline in relative competitiveness of U.S. corporations and its effect on U.S. middle-class).
153. Comparisons with other countries are difficult. Although the United
States is practically alone in providing no tax relief on dividends and retained
earnings, leverage ratios for nonfinancial corporations are higher in Germany
and japan than in the United States. SM Eli Remolona, Uruilrsl4ruling lntemaiUnuzl
Differences in 1..erJerap Tmtds, FRBNY Q, llEv. 31, 32 tbl.l (Spring 1990). However, unlike in the United States, where financial institutions are prohibited by
law from panicipating in the management of the firm, the financial institutions
that supply debt to German and Japanese businesses frequently panicipate in
their management. Gertler Be Hubbard, SUf1rG note 50, at 54. Financial economists believe that this panicipation tends to mitigate the aFcy problems from
debt. /d. at 53-56 (discussing harm from capital misaUocabon).

1993]

MEAN EFFECTIVE ToTAL TAX RATEs

1503

taking is reinforced by incomplete-loss offsets;•s. the bias is offset
by limited liability 155 and the realization requirement, which allow~ taxpayers to accelera.te d~uctions and defer inclusions by
selbng loss assets and holdmg gam assets. 15& The implementation
of a capital tax can operate in either direction. 15 7 The bias against
growth investments is reinforced by a tax system that captures accretions, even if they do not produce increases in net pres.ent
value; 158 this bias is offset by the realization requirement that permits gain on appreciated propeny to escape tax until the gain is
realized. 159 The bias against investment in intangible assets is reinforced by the nondeductibility of most educational expenses•so
and the prohibition against depreciating propeny with an indefinite life, such as goodwill; 161 this bias is offset by the immediate
deductibility of many of the expenses that are used to produce
intangible assets, such as wages and training costs.•s2
Looking beyond the three biases, there is reason to believe
that eliminating the differential treatment of debt and equity will
not create another large distonion, although it will cure one.•ss
As the reader might recall, one effect of the favorable treatment of
debt is to encourage corporations to take on more debt as they
balance .the tax savings from debt against increased agency
costs. 164 Because the former is a transfer payment and the latter a
154. Stiglitz, supra note 118, at 275-79; sn also MAJD Be MYERS, supra note
115, at 20-21 (discussing how tax asymmetries impact after-tax net present value
of projects); Campisano Be Romano, supra note 118, at 722-SO (discussing treatment of net operating losses and its effect on risk taking).
155. Without limited liability, there would be no asset substitution. Thus,
limited liability encourages risk taking.
156. George Constantinides, Co.Jlital Mtrrlut Equilibrium With Penonal Tax, 51
ECONOMETRJCIA 611, 6SS-S4 (198S).
157. SN joseph Bankman Be Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Betwem an Income
Tax and a Cmuumption Tax A Debate About Rislc7 Does it Matter7, 47 TAX L. REv. S77,
S9S-95 (1992); Manin S. Feldstein, The Effects ofTDXIltion on Risk Taking, 77 j. PoL.
EcoN. 755, 761-64 (1969); see also Stiglitz, supra note 118, at 270-74 (analyzing
after tax income assuming full loss offset).
158. jeff Strnad, TDXIltion of Income from Capital: A Theorrtical Reappraisal, S7
STAN. L. REV. 102S, 107S (1985).
159. SN jEFF STRNAD, TAX DEPRECIATION AND RISK 64-7S (California lnstit.
of Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. 765, 1991); William A. Klein, Timing in
Pemmal TQXtJtion, 6 j. LEGAL STUD. 461, 46S (1977).
160. Paul B. Stephen III, Fedmd Income TDX4tion and Human Capital, 70 VA. L.
REv. 1!57, 1S75 (1984).
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(l)(b) (1988).
162. SN Stephen, supra note 160, at IS68 (discussing concept of human capital as it relates to federal income tax system).
16S. Because of the complex interactions, one cannot be sure of the former.
164. For a further discussion of the favorable tax treatment of debt, see
supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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real cost, the differential treatment of debt and equity wastes resources. Hence, eliminating that differential will cure the bias and
end the waste.
The close relationship between technological advance and
real income growth provides additional support for eliminating
the differential tax treatment. There are two links in the chain:
the first link is between technological advance and productivity
growth; the second is between productivity growth and income
growth. The latter is obvious; 165 the former is not.
The argument that economic growth is fueled by technological advance was put forth by joseph Schumpeter at the tum of the
century.a66 Schumpeter argued that the accumulation of capital
was not th~ principal engine of economic growth, but rather entrepreneurship and innovation were the driving forces. For fifty
years, this bold thesis was met with skepticism, not only by Marxists, who viewed capitalism as the accumulation of capital and
therefore, might be expected to be critical, but also by mainstream
economists schooled in the static view of the marginalist revolution. Schumpeter's argument continued to be questioned until
Robert Solow provided evidence confirming Schumpeter's thesis.
In the 1950s, Solow set out to measure how much of the
1. 79% average annual increase in U.S. nonfarm labor productivity
that occurred in the first half of this century was due to increased
capital intensity. Consistent with Schumpeter's thesis, Solow
found that less than 20% of the increase was due to capital accumulation, the remainder being attributable to improved production practices and a more highly skilled labor force.l6 7 In 1985,
following Solow, Edward Denison calculated that only 13% of the
growth in worker productivity between 1929 and 1982 was due to
increased capital intensity. Denison concluded that 34%. of the
growth was due to improved worker education and 68% to improved technology.l68 Although scholars have quibbled over the
numbers, the conclusion is clear: U.S. income growth has over165. See PAUL KRuGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED ExPECTATIONS ch. I
(1990).
166. jOSEPH SCHUMPETU, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (19!4)
(first published in Germany, 1911).
167. Robert Solow,. TeclmoiDifical Clump and the Aggregate Production Function,
!9 REV. ECON. Be STAT. !12 (195?').
168. FREDERICK ScHERER Be DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 61! (!d ed. 1990) (citin' EDWARD F. DENISON,
TRENDS IN AMERICAN GROW'lll, 1929-82 50 (1982)). Demson's percentages total
more than 100% because some factors, such as reduced hours worked, decreased
productivity.
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whelmingly come from increasingly skilled workers applying new
and better technology.l 69 The same holds true for the other industrialized nations. 170 Thus, the important role that technological advance plays in fueling economic growth supports remedying
the capital misallocation caused by the corporate interest
deduction. 171
The argument for eliminating the differential treatment of
debt and equity is strengthened by studies showing that, at least
for major technological advances, only a small portion of the benefit is captured by the innovator, the remainder going to imitators
and other competitors, upstream and downstream producers, and
consumers. 172 Thus, the differential tax treatment, by discouraging innovative activity, is discouraging activities that produce large
external benefits.I75 Given such benefits, the social costs of discouraging these activities through the tax laws could be stagger169. EDWARD F. DENISON, WHY GRoWTH RATEs DltFER: POS1WAR ExPERIENCE IN NINE WESTERN CouNTRIES 297-SOO (1967) (discussing sources of economic growth in U.S.); see also ScHERER & Ross, supra note 168, ;at 61!-14
(discussing reasons for increase in U.S. income).
170. ScHERER & Ross, supra note 168, at 614; see generally LANDES, supra note
.12 (discussing relationship between technological change and economic development over last two centuries in Western Europe); NATHAN RosENBERG & L.E.
BIRDZELL, jR., How THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF
THE INDUSTRIAL WoRLD ch. 8 (1986) (discussing reasons for increase in United
States and Western European incomes during late 19th and early 20th centuries).
171. There are also non-economic reasons for concern over the capital distonion. International differences in the ability to develop and apply state-of-thean technology are an important determinant of the balance of military power.
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 168, at 614. In addition, it is widely acknowledged
that political and military power depend ultimately on economic productivity.
DERTOUZOUS ET AL., supra note 19, at 2.
172. Set, e.g., Timothy Bresnahan, Measuring the Spil/ovm from Technical .tldvmu:e: Mai'fljraftte Com.puten in Financial Smlias, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 742, 75S ( 1986)
(noting that social benefit equals 1.5 to 2 orders of magnitude above invention
cost); Zvi Griliches, Research Expmdilum, Education and the .tlggrrgau Agricultural
Production Frmction, 54 AM. EcoN. REv. 961, 964-71 (1964) (noting that social return from agricultural research at least 1.5 times greater than private return);
Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return From Jndwtriallnnovalitms,
91 QJ. EcoN. 221, 2SS (1977) (noting that for 17 major products innovations,
social return exceeded private return by between 77% and 150%). For a survey
of these and other studies, see Edwin Mansfield, Intell«tual p,pmy Rights, Technological Change and Economic Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERlY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL MARKET FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE ch. I (Charles E. Walker & Mark A.
Bloomfield eds., 1988). I am indebted to Rob Merges for directing me to these
sources.
17S. Levelling the tax treatment cannot make up for the externalities. However, if the activities discouraged by the corporate interest deduction are generally of the kind that produce large external benefits, then a case could be made
for revening the existing tax treatment to encourage, as opposed to merely not
discouraging, high-growth, high-risk activities that employ intangible assets.
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ing, and are likely to exceed any offsetting second-best effects. 17•
Absent a detailed prospective empirical study, it is not possible to be certain whether eliminating the differential treatment of
corporate debt and equity will improve welfare. However, there
are good reasons to believe that eliminating the differential will
produce signmcant improvements in welfare.
VI.

PROPOSALS TO EUMINATE FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF DEBT

This section reviews several possible solutions to the misallocation of capital within the corporate sector. These possible solutions include, among others, full-loss offsets for corporations, the
elimination of the corporate interest deduction and corporate
integration.
A. Full-Loss Offiets

It might be thought that the misallocation of capital described
in this Anicle is derivative of the misallocation caused by incomplete-loss offsets for corporations. Although the two problems are
related, neither one encompasses the other. Accordingly, a system of full-loss offsets, such as that proposed by Mark Campisano
and Roberta Romano, 17 5 would be only partially effective in remedying the distortion caused by the corporate interest deduction. It
would reduce, not eliminate, the disincentive to invest in high-risk
projects, but it would have no significant effect on the disincentive
to invest in growth projects employing intangible assets.
In contrast with existing tax law, under full-loss offsets the
government would provide a refund to a corporation with nega·tive taxable income. Thus, with a flat S4% federal corporate in174. The debate over industrial policy, sometimes referred to as picking
winners and losers, comes down to the extent to which the economic benefits of
technological and managerial improvements can be internalized by firms that develoP. them and the extent to which the government will get mired down in politics 1f it pursues an industrial policy. Critics of industrial policy disparage the
ability of government bureaucracies to do a better job than entrepreneurs and
investors and fear the possibility of government largesse being distributed on the
basis of political clout, not economic merit. The winners that everyone is searching for are high-growth companies. The winners might also be risky companies
that are good bets. However, risky companies and growth companies are disadvantaged by the tax law because of their low debt capacity. The proposal advanced in this Article is to eliminate the higher tax burden on risky ventures and
growth opponunities. 1bis would encourage investment in these activities while
still permitting the market, as opposed to the government, to determine which
projects are funded and which are not.
175. Campisano Be Romano, supra note 118, at 709.
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come t~ and full-loss offsets, a corporation that had a $10 million
net loss m 1992 would receive a $3.4 million refund.
Proponents of full-loss offsets point to the detrimental effect
on risk taking that the current system of incomplete-loss offsets
has. Because the tax system provides only a partial deduction for
loss.es, risky_ projects are taxed more heavily than are less risky
proJects, With the result that too few risky projects are
undertaken. 176
A system of full-loss offsets would ameliorate but not elimi- ·
nate the bias against risky investments. Investment in risky
projects is discouraged because corporations are taxed more heavily if they cannot use their interest deductions currendy. Thus,
giving corporations the right to use these deductions would eliminate the costs associated with carrying losses forward and possibly
seeing them expire. Risky firms also avoid debt because of the
associated financial distress costs. Full-loss offsets would not reduce this incentive for risky firms to eschew leverage.t77 Therefore, full-loss offsets would not elimipate the bias against risky
investments identified in this Article.
Furthermore, full-loss offsets would not ameliorate the tax
law's biases against investment in growth projects and intangible
property. Growth industries and industries that intensively use intangible property employ litde debt not because they cannot use
the interest deductions but because bankruptcy and financial distress are cosdy.
These results can be illustrated with Figure 1. Full-loss offsets can only cure the bias introduced by the differential declining
value of tax shields; that is, full-loss offsets can straighten out the
marginal benefit curve. Full-loss offsets cannot ameliorate the
bias from differential financial distress costs because it has no ef176. MAJD Be MYERS, supra note 115, at 20-21; Campisano Be Romano, supra
note 118, at 722-SO; see Clifford Smith et al., Finaru:itd EngiR«nng: Why Hedger, in
THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 129-!2 (Clifford Smith Be charles
Smithson eds., 1990) (providing lucid illustration).
177. Although full-loss offsets would reduce the bias against risk taking, this
comes at a cost in real resources. By increasing the value of the expected interest
tax shield, a system of full-loss offsets would encourage firms to use more leverage. Firms will, therefore, incur greater expected financial distress costs, which
are real resource costs to society, when they balance these costs against the
greater expected tax savings. The welfare effect of implementing a system of
full-loss offsets depends on whether the benefits of improved risk bearing exceed
the financial distress costs of additional leverage. If, however, full-loss offsets are
implemented and the interest deduction is simultaneously eliminated, there is no
trade-off, only the improved risk-bearing occurs.
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feet on the marginal cost curve.t7s
B. Elimination of Corporate Interest Deduction

Eliminating the corporate interest deduction would remedy
the bias against investments in risky growth projects employing
intangible assets. Because that action, by itself, would raise corporate tax revenues, the federal government could simultaneously
eliminate the corporate interest deduction and reduce the corporate tax rate from the current 34%, 179 without reducing corporate
tax revenues. 180 Of course, eliminating the corporate interest deduction and reducing the statutory corporate tax rate would not
remedy the misallocation of capital between corporate and
noncorporate sectors; investment in the corporate form would still
be discouraged. 1st
Furthermore, although the proposal would eliminate the taxinduced incentive to issue debt, because interest would no longer
be deductible, it would not remove tax considerations from the
capital structure decision. Eliminating the corporate interest deduction, while maintaining the tax advantages of equity-the
deferral of investor-level tax on retained earnings-would encourage corporations to issue equity. 182 A means of eliminating
the resulting advantage from retained earnings would be to tax
equity investors on their portion of a corporation's retained earnings and give them a basis adjustment in their stock. Taking these
actions would place debt.and equity, as well as dividends andre178. Similarly, eliminating the tax advantage of debt would not eliminate
the bias against risk taking introduced by incomplete-loss offsets, but it would
reduce it.
179. Because the corporate income tax is highly distortionary, it is a poor
vehicle for raising additional revenue through a tax hike. For a discussion of the
corporate income tax's distortionary effect, see infra note 191 and accompanying
text.
180. Presenting the reform as revenue neutral isolates the impact ofrestruc·
turing the corporate tax from the effect of raising or lowering taxes on
corporations.
181. The argument presented in this Article, that the corporate interest deduction misallocates capital, does not apply to individual taxpayers and passthrough entities, such as partnerships, because income earned by individuals and
pass-through entities is subject to only one level of tax. Thus, there can be a
deduction for interest paid by individuals, whether for business or investment
reasons or, more generally, even if there is not a corporate interest deduction,
without creating problems of the kind described here.
182. One implication of encouraging corporations to issue equity rather
than debt is that It would encourage investment in growth companies because
they can put retained earnings to good use. Furthermore, it would encourage
corporations to retain capital for unproductive investments and would increase
the cost of using debt to discipline management.
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tained earnings, on par, thereby removing tax considerations from
the capital structure decision.
As~uming th~t the bias agai~st investment in the corporate
form wdl not be Simultaneously eliminated by integrating the corporate and personal tax systems, a possibility which is taken up
next, a strong case can be made in favor of the proposed changes:
eliminate the corporate interest deduction, lower corporate tax
rates, and tax equityholders on their allocated share of retained
earnings while providing them with a basis adjustment.•ss By
equalizing the tax treatment of debt and equity, the proposed
changes would have two advantages. First, the changes would
eliminate the waste that results from the tendency to encourage
corporations to balance reduced taxes against increased financial
distress costs.•s• Second, the changes would eliminate the misallocation of capital within the corporate sector.l 85 Such changes
are likely to improve welfare. 186 If any biases that should be eliminated remain after implementing the proposed changes, it would
ISS. Edward Kleinbard proposes replacing the corporate interest deduction
with a cost of capital allowance (COCA), which would pennit a corporation a
..deduction equal to the product of its invested capital and a statutory. COCA.
COCA would be a fixed fraction of the cost of capital, and invested capital would
be the adjusted tax bases of the corporation's assets. Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Dtbt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allt1wanct System, 67
TAXEs 94S, 957 (1989); su also Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Dmvatiw Products:
Finmu:it;U lnflt1Vation :S NewtSt Claallmgt to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REv. IS19, 1S6S68 (1991) (discussing implementation of COCA deduction). A similar proposal
was advanced by the Institute for Fiscal Studies. Set INsTmrrE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, EQ.UITY FOR CoMPANIES: A CoRPORATION TAX FOR THE 1990's (Fourth Report
of the Institute for Fiscal Studies Capital Taxes Group, Commentary No. 26,
London, 1991). Like the proposal to eliminate the interest deduction and reduce
corporate taxes, COCA would eliminate the interest deduction. However, to
compensate for the loss of the interest deduction, it would not lower corporate
tax rates but would instead provide a deduction for all of the capital used in the
business. Consideration of this complex and intriguing proposal for refonn must
wait for another opportunity.
There are several problems with COCA as an alternative to the corporate
income tax without an interest deduction. First, COCA, by reducing taxable income, would exacerbate the disincentive to invest in risky projects caused by incomplete-loss offsets. Second, the higher tax rate under COCA implies a larger
distortion from the corporate tax.
184. For a discussion of the waste that results from the tendency to encourage corporations to balance reduced taxes against increased financial distress costs, see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
185. By eliminating the misallocation, it would also increase corporate investment in risky projects and growth opportunities, which most commentators
would applaud.
186. Because of the general theory of the second best, the previous conclusion cannot be stated categorically. For a discussion of the effects of such
changes on the general welfare of the country, see sutmJ notes IS0-1M and accompanying text.
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be desirable to eradicate such biases by amending the tax law in a
manner that does not waste real resources. 187

C. CtnfJO'rtJU Integration
The Treasury Department (Treasury) recently released a
long-awaited and lengthy (24 7 pages) study of corporate integration.188 The idea behind corporate integration is to eliminate the
double taxation of corporate earnings, which discourages businesses from using the corporate form and reduces investment in
activities that can best be done in that form. 189 In addition to subjecting corporate income to only a single level of tax, thereby placing it on par with noncorporate investments, corporate integration
is also intended to eliminate the distortion between debt and equity finance.J90
187. Ultimately, the dift'erential treatment of corporate debt and equity is
not likely to be desirable. It would be more efficient to correct any biases that
might possiblyjustify the dift'erential treatment with direct taxes and so avoid the
waste the trade-oft' produces.
188. TREASURY DEP'T REPORT, sufmJ note 44.
189. The interaction between taxation and the choice of business form is
formally modelled by jane G. Gravelle 8c Laurence Kotlikoft', Tlu Jncillmce and
E.J/identy Costs of Corporau Tamtion WAm Ctlrptlrau aflll Ntmeflf'/JOrau Firms Prodwe the
Same Goods, 97 j. PoL. EcoN. 749 (1989).
190. A normative argument for taxing debt more heavily than equity might
be based on limited liability, which numerous commentators have critically
viewed as an inappropriate subsidy that permits corporations to externalize risk.
Set, '·I· , Henry Hansmann 8c Reinier Kraakman, TIIU/Qrd Unlimilld Shtmholdlr Liability for CArptwuu Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879, 1882-8S (199l);jonathan M. Landers,
A Unified Approach to Parmt, Subsilliary and AJ/iliale Qrustions in &nllrupky, 42 U. CHI.
L. REv. 589, 619-20 (1975). Financial economists have recognized that limited
liability can be viewed as a put option on the firm's assets with an exercise price
equal to the outstanding debt, the value of which (other things being equal) increases with the variance of earnings. Ross 8c WESTEilFIELD, sufmJ note 21, at
627, 6S7. Consequently, because debt capacity decreases with risk, the tax burden is directly related to the limited liability subsidy. Thus, the argument goes,
because the higher tax counteracts the limited liability subsidy, the dift'erential
treatment of debt and equity should not be eliminated.
The difficulty with the above justification is that it ignores the harmful consequences from the lower tax on debt that are unrelated to the limited liability
subsidy: the waste in real resources and discouraging investment in growth
projects and intangible assets. Furthermore, because limited liability is a subsidy
only to the extent that risk can be externalized and many voluntary creditors,
especially debtholders, protect themselves through higher interest rates, the cor·
relation between risk and the value of the subsidy across firms is imperfect and
might be weak. See Richard A. Posner, Tlat Rights of Crwlitors of Ajfilit.IUd Corpora·
tion.s, 4S U. CHI. L. REv. 499, 501-05 (1976).
Another possible argument in favor of the corporate interest deduction analogizes corporate and individual taxpayers. The personal deduction for interest
paid on business debts ensures an accurate measure of taxable income. To illustrate, consider an individual with an opponunity to receive $1000 next year by
investing $800 today. If the individual invests $800, the individual will realize
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. ~cc~rding ~o ja~e Gravelle, the double tax on corporate equity 1s h•ghly d1storuonary. She estimates that every additional
dollar of tax collected through the federal corporate income tax is
accompanied by throwing away between $.50 and $1 in distortions.l91 Accordingly, integration has become a crusade among
tax policy specialists, producing a lengthy literature on corporate
integration, to which this Article cannot do justice. My more modest goal is to address the extent to which the various integration
proposals respond to the capital misallocation described in this
Article.I92
I. Prototypes Examined in the Treasury DtpartmenJ Study

The Treasury's corporate integration study outlines three options for restructuring the corporate tax system. The most extensive restructuring option is the Comprehensive Business Income
Tax (CBIT). Under CBIT, shareholders and bondholders exclude
dividends and interest from income, but neither payment is deductible by the corporation. Thus, CBIT taxes all corporate earnings at the corporate level. Treasury views CBIT as a long-term
comprehensive means of equalizing the tax treatments of corporate and noncorporate investments as well as debt and equity.1 95
Treasury considers the dividend exclusion prototype, which
would eliminate the personal-level tax on dividends, the easiest
restructuring option to implement. Corporations would continue
to pay tax on their after-interest earnings. Investors would be
taxed on interest received but not on dividends. Thus, the divi$200 profit, which the government will tax. If the individual only has $400 to
invest and takes in a panner with whom the individual will split the profits, then
each panner will realize a profit of $100, which the government will tax. Suppose that instead of taking a panner, the investor borrows $400, agreeing to
repay $500. This leaves the investor with a profit of$100 and the lender with a
profit of $100. Without the interest deduction, the investor's profit would be
$200 and the total taxable profit would be $500. Thus, without a personal deduction for interest on business loans, income would be overstated for tax purposes and the financing decisions of noncorporate entities would be biased in
favor of equity over debt.
The above argument does not extend to the corporate tax because corporations are taxed as separate entities, which results in a double tax on corporate
equity but a single tax on corporate debt. Accordingly, the corporate interest
deduction turns debt into a device for reducing tax, thereby influencing corporate financing decisions.
191. GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 22-50.
192. This Anicle only considers the most basic of the integration proposals
under the simplest of circumstances. A fuller treatment incorporating integration complexities, such as treatment of tax-exempt shareholders and effects of
various withholding regimes must wait for another day.
195. TREASURY 0EP'T REPORT, supra note 44, at !9.
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dend exclusion prototype taxes the investor on interest and the
corporation on dividends and retained earnings. The Treasury
currently favors the dividend exclusion prototype. 194
Under the third restructuring option, shareholder allocation,
shareholders would include allocated amounts in taxable income,
receive a credit for corporate taxes paid, and increase the basis in
their shares by the income allocated. Distributions would be
treated as a return of capital to the extent of basis and, thereafter,
as capital gain. 195 In contrast to CBIT, which eliminated the tax
disparity between debt and equity by taxing the income from both
at the corporate level, the shareholder allocation prototype has
the effect of taxing debt and equity income at the shareholderlevel.196

2. E.lfoctiveness of Different Prototypes in Eliminating Investment Bias
The various integration proposals are not equally effective in
eliminating the biases introduced by the corporate interest deduction. Although the tax law's tendency to discourage high-risk,
high-growth projects that use intangible property can be eliminated by putting debt and equity on a par, that tendency is reduced, but not eliminated, when the tax treatment of equity is
improved, compensating for its disadvantage inside the corporation, by reducing the investor-level tax.
Of the three prototype restructuring options studied by the
Treasury, only CBIT would eliminate the subsidy on debt and
therefore remove the bias against high-risk, high-growth projects
using intangible assets. CBIT eliminates the bias because neither
interest nor dividends are deductible. In addition, CBIT does not
permit corporations to avoid taxes by issuing equity and retaining
earnings because neither dividends nor interest are includible by
the recipient. This effect can be illustrated using Figure I. The
194. /d. at 15.
195. A founh prototype, the shareholder credit prototype, is discussed in
the section on roads not taken. This prototype was recommended in AMERICAN
I..J.w INSTITUTE, REPORTER's STUDY or CoRPORATE TAX INTEGRAnoN (March 81,
1998) (Alvin C. Warn:n,jr., reponer). It is also the dominant form of integration
abroad. Under the American Law Institute's shareholder credit proposal, share·
holders, when they receive a dividend, include the dividend plus the corporatelevel tax in income and receive a credit against personal-level taxes for corporate
taxes paid. If the corporate tax exceeds the investor's tax rate, the excess credit
can be used to shelter other income. Thus, the shareholder credit prototype
taxes all corporate earnings at the individual level.
196. Although the shareholder allocation prototype effectively taxes corpo·
rate income at the investor level, it does not eliminate the corporate-level tax.
Instead, it uses the corporate tax as a withholding tax.
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downward-sloping marginal tax shield schedule is shifted down to
the horizontal axis because the corporate-level tax advantage from
debt is eliminated by CBIT. Similarly, that portion of the upwardsloping marginal cost schedule that represents the investor-level
tax advantage from equity is also coincident with the horizontal
axis. Thus, the capital structure decision is a function only of expected financial distress costs, so that corporate value is maximized by choosing the capital structure that minimizes these costs.
Encouraging managers to set capital structure to minimize expected financial distress costs is efficient and socially desirable.
Such action would eliminate two disadvantages of the current tax
system. First, setting capital structure to minimize expected financial distress costs eliminates the waste incurred when managers
balance tax savings against increased financial distress costs. Because the former are transfer payments but the latter are real
costs, the current law encourages managers to make such a balance. In this way, the current law reduces national wealth. Second, setting capital structure to minimize expected financial
distress costs eliminates the misallocation of capital that arises because corporations with the largest debt capacities have the lowest
tax rates and capital costs and therefore attract disproportionately
large amounts of capitaJ.I97
The other two prototypes would reduce the tax benefits from
leverage. However, because neither prototype would eliminate
tax considerations from the capital structure decision, they would
leave corporations with an incentive to balance reduced taxes
against real costs. As a result, they would encourage waste and
bias investment.
The dividend exclusion prototype would reduce the biases
caused by the interest deduction, but it would not eliminate them.
Under the dividend exclusion prototype, interest income is taxed
at the recipient's level, but dividends and retained earnings are
taxed at the level of the corporate payor. With the dividend exclusion prototype, corporations would have an incentive to issue debt
as long as the effective corporate tax rate exceeds the tax rate of
the marginal investor. However, as the corporation issues more
debt, the effective tax rate will decline as the probability increases
that the corporation will not be able to use all of its interest deductions currently. When the effective corporate and marginal inves197. An additional advantage to CBIT is that it reduces the bias against risktaking from incomplete-loss offsets because eliminating the dividend deduction
reduces the likelihood that a corporation will have suspended losses.
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tor's tax rates are equal, the tax advantage from debt disappears,
and thereafter, there is a tax disadvantage from issuing more
debt. 198
The third prototype, shareholder allocation, is probably the
most effective of the three prototypes studied by the Treasury after CBIT in eliminating the biases caused by the corporate interest
deduction. 199 The shareholder allocation prototype requires each
investor to include in income the investor's share of the corporation's pre-tax income after deducting interest payments made by
the corporation and provides the investor a credit for the tax paid
by the corporation. If the investor's tax rate exceeds the corporation's tax rate, the investor owes additional tax. If, however, the
investor's tax rate is below the corporation's tax rate, the investor
can use the excess credits to reduce its federal income tax bill.
By treating the corporation as a conduit, the tax benefits of
financial structure are largely eliminated. 200 Even so, the proposed shareholder allocation prototype does not eliminate taxes
from the capital structure decision. This is a result of maintaining
the corporate interest deduction and incomplete-loss offsets combined with no provision for passing losses through to investors.
The effect of these provisions is to discourage corporations from
issuing debt because the marginal value of the tax shield decreases
with leverage. Thus, if debt can reduce agency costs, the corporation will have to pay a tax penalty for issuing debt. 201
198. Corporations are more likely to have negative income with the dividend exclusion prototype than with CBIT. Thus, the dividend exclusion prototype does not reduce the bias apinst risk introduced by incomplete-loss offsets.
199. With the exception that investors include within income only that portion of the corporation's pre-tax income that is distributed as a dividend, the
following comments about the shareholder allocation prototype also apply to the
shareholder credit prototype recommended by the American Law Institute.
200. One advantage of the shareholder allocation prototype over the dividend exclusion prototype is that the shareholder allocation prototype eliminates
the tax law's tendency to produce a clientele effect for bonds and stocks.
20 I. An example will help to illustrate this point. Assume there is a single
investor and that both the investor and the corporation are taxed at 80%. If the
corporation has income of $100 before the interest deduction, the investor
should have an after-tax gain of $70. However, when the interest paid is greater
than $100, it causes the investor's net gain to be less than $70. Assume the corporation paid $150 in interest. After the interest deduction, the corporation will
have a $50 loss and thus no tax liability. The investor will pay $45 in taxes on his
interest income of$150,leaving him with $105. However, the $50 loss does not
pass through to the investor to offset other income. Therefore, the investor suffers a $50 loss in the value of his equity without receiving a corresponding tax
benefit. The investor's $105 gain, coupled with the $50 loss in equity, results in
the investor having only a $55 net gain. A tax penalty of $15 has been incurred
for paying more that $100 in interest.

1993]

MEAN EFFEcnvE ToTAL TAX RATEs

1515

D. Other Potential Solutions
.
The tax code's favorable treatment of debt over equity biases
mvestment and hampers economic growth. There are several tax
reform propos~s under consideration that proponents claim
would stimulate mvestment and growth. These include the investment tax credit (lTC), the R&D tax credit and a reduction in the
capital gains tax rate. In this section, I argue that none of these
reforms would eliminate the identified bias.
I. lTC and RfSD Tax Credit

One possible method of overcoming the biases against
growth and risk-taking is to adopt either or both an lTC and R&D
tax credit. Although there might be reasons for having such credits within the corporate tax, they cannot justify retaining the corporate interest deduction. There are two reasons for this. First,
the overlap between the activities discouraged by the corporate
interest deduction and those encouraged by the two credits is imperfect. If the overlap is weak, then the bias will not be remedied.
Second, the tax credits would not eliminate the excess financial
distress costs because the corporate interest deduction encourages corporations to increase their proportional leverage. 2o2

2. Capital Gains Reduction
Capital gains reduction has become a partisan political issue.
Proponents, including the Reagan and Bush administrations, argue that a capital gains reduction would increase investment. Opponents argue that it will do litde to increase investment but much
to reduce taxes on the wealthy. Whatever the merits of these two
conflicting positions, the only effect of a capital gains reduction
that is of consequence to my thesis is its effect on the relative effective total tax rates of debt and equity. Because capital gains
account for a larger share of equity's total gain than of debt's total
gain, a capital gains reduction would lower the effective total tax
rate on equity relative to that on debt. This would reduce the bias
towards debt, thereby reducing the magnitude of the distortion. 205
However, it would not eliminate the bias, even if the capital gains
rate were reduced to zero, because the effective tax rate on equity
would still exceed the effective tax rate on debt.
202. Stt grnmdly THE R8cD TAX CuDrr: IssuEs IN TAX Poucv AND INDusTRW. INNOVAnoN (Kenneth M. Browned., 1984) (discussing R&:D tax credit, including survey of research findings).
20!1. I am indebted to my colleague, Alex Capron, for this observation.
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CONCLUSION

Because current tax law allows corporations to deduct interest
but not dividends and retained earnings, debt financing is taxed
more favorably than is equity financing. Thus~ the existing tax law
encourages corporations to increase leverage. However, not all
corporations can increase leverage as easily. Because high-risk,
high-growth projects employing intangible assets cannot support
as much leverage as can low-risk, low-growth projects employing
tangible assets, the existing corporate tax law discourages investment in the former in favor of investment in the latter. This misallocates capital within the corporate sector and discourages
investment in precisely those industries and activities that many
commentators consider to be critical to the economic future of the
United States.

